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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LONGSHOREMEN'S
AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT COVERS WATERFRONT
INJURIES TO CARGO HANDLERS WHO SOMETIMES WORK OFFSHORE OR
WHO UNPACK CONTAINERS.

Petitioners,' operators of marine container terminals, sought
reversal of Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act' (LHWCA) awards to injured respondents.3 Respondent Caputo, normally a member of a stevedoring gang, was injured while
temporarily loading consignees' trucks with goods previously removed from containers. Respondent Blundo, a checker who
marked items being taken from containers, sustained injuries after
slipping on an icy pier. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals4 upheld awards- finding respondents were both "maritime employees"
within the meaning of LHWCA § 902(3).6 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Where a worker actually
works over navigable water for part of his activity and is physically
moving cargo on the waterfront when injured, or where a worker is
an integral part of the loading or unloading process, such as a
checker, when injured, the worker is engaged in maritime employment within the meaning of LHWCA § 902(3) and is, therefore,
1. Northeast Marine Terminal Company and International Terminal Operating Company, in consolidated cases on writs of certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. Ralph Caputo, employee of Northeast Marine Terminal Company, and
Carmelo Blundo, employee of International Terminal Operating Co., both of New
York City.
4. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976)
(consolidation of Blundo & Caputo cases); 2 BRBS 376 (Blundo case); 3 BRBS
13 (Caputo case).
5. Contested LHWCA claims are heard by an administrative law judge. 33
U.S.C. § 919(d) (Supp. V 1975). Appeals are made to a three member Benefits
Review Board appointed by the Secretary of Labor under authority of the 1972
amendments. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The Board must affirm if the
lower decision is "supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as
a whole." 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975). The 1972 amendments provide
for direct appeal from the Board to the court of appeals. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (Supp.
V 1975). If an administrative judgment is awarded, it is paid pending appeal and
absent a showing of irreparable harm to the employer. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3)
(Supp. V 1975).
6. See note 47 infra.

292

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 10: 291

entitled to compensation for work-related injuries. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 2348 (1977).
Workmen's compensation acts are designed to provide immediate medical care' and partial wage substitution 8 to workers disabled by any injury "arising out of and in the course of employment." 9 This subsistence income for every injury" replaces the
remedies and defenses otherwise available between employer and
employee." In testing the first state general compensation act,'2 a
unanimous Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a death
benefits award for a railroad worker. 13 Ten weeks later, in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen," the Court held an attempt to apply the
state act to the maritime death of a longshoreman ten feet from
land to be an impermissible intrusion into "the proper harmony
7. See 33 U.S.C. § 939(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 33 U.S.C. § 907(b) (Supp. V
1975).
8. Congress expects that 90 percent of LHWCA awards will be equivalent to
two-thirds of the worker's former yage. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1972). The actual amount is based on the "national average weekly wage" of
"production or non-supervisory workers on private nonagricultural payrolls." 33
U.S.C. §§ 902(19), 906(b), 908(a)-(c) (Supp. V 1975). Twenty-eight states have
recently adopted the state's average weekly wage as the basis rather than the
employee's individual wage. 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (Supp. 6

1977).
9. The quoted phrase is from the British compensation act. Act of August 6th
1897, 60 & 61 Vict., c. 37, §1(.1). The phrase has been used verbatim in the acts
of 42 states and the LHWCA. For a discussion of the construction of the phrase,
see A. LARSON, supra note 8, at §§ 6-29.
10. Compensation acts "do not rest on any tort theory, but upon one of social
insurance." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 525 (4th ed.
1971). See also W. PROSSER § 80, at 531.
11. The "employer liability acts" abrogated the three common law defenses
in favor of the employer: the fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, and
contributory negligence. See A. LARSON, supra note 8, at § 4.50. Workmen's compensation acts lifted the worker's affirmative burden of showing fault on the
employer's part. It is sometimes mistakenly assumed that without these compensation acts, the three common law defenses apply. Employer liability acts prevent
that in most cases. See, e.g., C.D. Johnson Lumber Corp. v. Hutchens, 194 F.2d
574 (9th Cir. 1952). Whether compensation acts are a form of strict liability is
disputed. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 80 at 531 (strict liability). Contra A.
LARSON, supra note 8, at §§ 2.20-2.30 (the injury, not the risk, needs compensation). But see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 430 (2d ed. 1975)
("sufficient participation in the risk").
12. New York Workmen's Compensation Act, 1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 41,316.
13. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
14. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The White and Jensen cases were argued together.
Jensen had a 5-4 majority.
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and uniformity of [general maritime law]." 5 As state compensation acts proliferated, Congress twice attempted to permit their
application to maritime injuries. 6 Although the Court held such
legislation to be an unconstitutional delegation, it fashioned the
"maritime but local" doctrine to alleviate the harsh disparity of
Jensen, permitting state awards in "certain local matters [in
which state] regulation would work no material prejudice to the
general maritime law. 17 Because the Court excluded longshoremen from this exception,'" Congress established a federal protection by enacting the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927.' 9 To avoid jurisdictional objection, Congress
provided LHWCA coverage only where "recovery . . . may not
validly be provided by state law."20 The Court construed this to
require mutual exclusivity with state laws. 2' Thereafter, each case
forced the Court into a constitutional analysis of its "maritime but
local" doctrine to determine which law applied. Moreover, because
the Court had defined the effect but not the substance of
"maritime but local," a worker could not know prior to litigation
which act applied to his injury. 22 The Court ignored the need for
certainty in the election of forum as it had ignored the need for
15.

244 U.S. at 216.

16. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 passed five months after Jensen
was held unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149
(1920). Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 was held unconstitutional in
Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). See G. GILMIORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 11, at 407-08.
17. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922).
18. "The unloading of a ship is not a matter of purely local concern as we have
often pointed out." Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233, 236
(1930) (reversing a state compensation award for longshoreman's death over
navigable water).
19. Ch. 509, §§ 1-51, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970)).
20. Id. Section 903(a) of the Act read:
(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee but only if the disability or death results
from injury upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law ....
21. In upholding the LHWCA, Justice Hughes insisted that the Court have
review of jurisdictional facts de novo rather than the limited review for error as
specified in the LHWCA. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46-49 (1932).
22. "[T]he contours of the 'local concern' concept were and have been necessarily vague and uncertain. There has never been any method of staking them
out except litigation in particular cases." Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S.
114, 124-25 (1962). See generally, A. LARSON, supra note 8, at § 89.23(b).
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parity of benefits in Jensen. The problem crippled the administration of waterfront compensation for fifteen years. In Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries23 the Court recognized the need for
certainty of forum," and announced that administrative decisions,
26
25
state and federal, should be presumed correct in "twilight zone"
cases absent substantial evidence of error. Justice Frankfurter, in
concurring with this procedural bypass of the LHWCA exclusivity
clause, indicated "theoretic illogic" 2 7 was necessary to insure
"simple and dependable enforcement" and to avoid "the difficulties which the judicial process itself brought into being." The
twilight zone concept largely resolved the jurisdiction and certainty problems. 29 However, the problem of disparity of benefit
schedules under the two systems available to each worker remained. Although the Court had designed the twilight zone to
assure workers of some remedy, many workers used the zone for a
different purpose. The lure of higher benefits3 caused workers to
claim coverage in the higher paying jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit
halted the expansion of the twilight zone after a LHWCA award
3
was made by the district court in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck l
for injuries suffered during new ship construction on navigable
waters. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, in clear cases,
effective enforcement required courts to "have the resourcefulness
to ascertain and . . . the fortitude to stand by the declaration of
23.

317 U.S. 249 (1942).

24. Looking for an "undefined and undefinable point ....

[t]his Court has
been unable to give any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state
power in advance of litigation. . . . Yet, employees are asked to determine with
certainty before bringing their actions that factual question over which courts
regularly divide among themselves and within their own membership. As penalty
for error, the injured individual may not only suffer serious financial loss through
the delay and expense of litigation, but discover that his claim has been time
barred by the statute of limitations in the proper forum while he was erroneously
pursuing it elsewhere." 317 U.S. at 253-54. [Footnote omitted]
25. The Court originally had insisted that it have review of jurisdictional
determinations in LHWCA cases. See note 21 supra.
26, As with the "maritime but local" exception, the Court never defined the
substance of the twilight zone.
27. Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. at 258-59 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
28. 317 U.S. at 258-59.
29. See Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel, 358 U.S. 272, 274 (1959). (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. By 1971, eleven maritime states paid higher benefits that did the
LHWCA. A. LARSON, supra note 8, at § 89.27.
31. 293 F.2d at 52, 56 (5th Cir. 1961).
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an identifiable line.

' 32

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that

33
every injury on navigable waters was covered by LHWCA.
LHWCA coverage was no longer exclusive of state coverage. 3 To
achieve certainty of forum the Court abandoned the canon that a
textual approach was paramount in interpreting the Act. Instead,
the Court found passages in the legislative history35 which recognized the forum problem and thus drew "a reasonable inference"
that Congress had never intended to incorporate the judicial
"maritime but local" doctrine into LHWCA interpretation.3 6 Some
courts misinterpreted Calbeck as a signal to liberalize federal jurisdiction and to allow LHWCA recovery even on land.37 These courts
did not recognize the destruction of the "maritime but local" line
as destruction of the twilight zone around that line. They simply
moved the zone landward and centered it on the shoreline. However, in Nacerima Operating Co., Inc. v. Johnson3 the Supreme
Court explained why the twilight zone approach was inappropriate
after Calbeck. "Congress did not extend coverage to longshoremen
• . .whose injuries occurred on the landward side of the Jensen
line, clearly entitling them to protection under the state compensation Acts [since] otherwise the reach of the federal Act
[LHWCA] would be subject to uncertainty." 9 The objective certainty which the shoreline gave to the choice of forum problem
overrode the jurisdictional scheme established by the text of the
LHWCA and case law." The Court recognized the disparity of
compensation for similarly employed workers, but refused to
"perpetuate on the landward side of the Jensen line the same

32. 293 F.2d at 56.
33. Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962). This was a reinterpretation of the substance of the LHWCA, not a procedural distinction as in the
creation of the twilight zone concept.
34. The Act will "provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have been
within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law." 370 U.S.
at 117.
35. See id. at 120 n.9.
36. Id. at 123-24. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
37. Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968).

38. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
39. 316 U.S. at 219-221. "[R]emoving uncertainties . . .is a far cry from
construing the act to reach injuries on land .... Calbeck's holding rejected the
notion that the line should advance or recede .... As in Calbeck, we refuse to

impute to Congress the intent of burdening the administration of compensation
by perpetuating such confusion." 396 U.S. at 221. See also 396 U.S. at 215 n.7.
40. See note 21 supra.
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confusion that previously existed on the seaward side."" However,
refusal to allow LHWCA ashore was not the problem it might have
been since most injured workers were eligible for higher awards
under state acts than under the LHWCA. 2 When Congress prepared to raise LHWCA rates above those of most states,43 it recognized that unless coverage were concomitantly extended inland,
disparity in benefits would quantitatively increase among longshoremen. 4 Congressional committee reports45 also recognized a
qualitative disparity. With the advent of container techniques,
more of the longshoreman's work is performed on shore, causing a
greater portion of that group to be denied coverage. The 1972
amendments achieved the overall expansion of LHWCA coverage
by expanding the situs" and restricting coverage to "maritime
employment," a status test.47 The report describes the status test's
application:
41. 396 U.S. at 224.
42. See note 30 supra.
43. See note 30 supra. At present the LHWCA rates (for total disability) are
two hundred percent of the average industrial wage and much higher than the
benefits paid by any state except Alaska. See A. LARsON, supra note 8, at § 89.27.
44. The amendments removed a loophole which had allowed workers to recover damages beyond LHWCA benefits. Starting with Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946), an injured longshoreman could avail himself of the
benefits of the LHWCA and also sue the owner of the ship on which he was
working for damages. A shipowner was liable, regardless of fault, under the doctrine of seaworthiness. In addition, under Ryan Stevedoring v. Pan Atl. S.S.
Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956), shipowners could recover the damages from the stevedore's employer on theories of express or implied warranty. Although the Act
limits an employer's liability to compensation and medical benefits, a stevedoreemployer is indirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman. See S. REP.
No. 1125, supra note 8, at 9. Congress wanted to end this triangle but the quid
pro quo was higher LHWCA rates and expanded coverage since the Sieracki-Ryan
triangle had allowed recovery for shore injuries.
45. S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 8, at 12-13.
46. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) reads in part, "injury occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or any other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel)."
47. "The term 'employee' means any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any
vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small
vessel under eighteen tons net." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3). Prior to 1972, it was not
necessary that the injured employee himself have been in maritime employment.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340-42 (1953).
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The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation
system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by
this Act for part of their activity. To take a typical example, cargo,
whether in break bulk or containerized form, is typically unloaded
from the ship and immediately transported to a storage or holding
area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable waters. The
employees who perform this work would be covered under the bill
for injuries sustained by them over the navigable waters or on the
adjoining land areas. The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel, just because they are in the area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment
would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose
jobs do not require them to participate in the loading or unloading
of cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved
in the loading or unloading functions are covered by the new amendment."
Congress, in an attempt to control the specific scope of coverage,
reassumed the role it had delegated to the Court in the original
LHWCA.4 9
In the instant case, the Court characterized the original LHWCA
as having served as "a gapfiller," a role modified by the 1972
amendments. " After declining to detail the previous Act's judicial
history, the Court noted without comment the Nacirema majority's desire to alleviate confusion and the dissent's desire to lessen
the harsh disparity of treatment for workers of the same status.51
The Court pointed out that Congress had failed to define either in
the amendments or in the committee reports the new statutory
terms classifying coverage as to either situs of the injury or status
of the injured. The Court did not attempt to construe the terms
relating to coverage in the text of the amendments. Instead, the
Court analyzed the committee reports. While the reports expressed
the Act's purpose, the Court found the closest affirmative definition of coverage in the "typical example. '"52 Even this example, the
Court declared, was silent as to coverage of workers, such as Caputo and Blundo, who handle cargo after its immediate unloading
48.
49.
50.
of the
51.
52.

See note 45 supra.
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2354. The statement ignored the earlier judicial modification
original gapfiller function. See text accompanying notes 31-36 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2355.
See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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from the ship. However, the Court relied on the broad language of
the legislation and found that expansive interpretation is both
suggested and appropriate. The Court noted Congress' realization
that modem longshoring is more land-based than in the past, and,
in considering the purposes of the Act, found a clear intent to cover
respondents. 3 The Court reasoned that Congress intended to cover
performance of tasks traditionally performed on board ship, noting
that filling the hold of a vessel is done on board ship and that a
container is the modem equivalent of the hold of a ship. Therefore,
until the container is unpacked, the unloading process is incomplete and remains "longshoring" within the amendments. Hence,
the Court found it apparent that respondent Blundo was a statutory employee since he was an "integral" part of the modem unloading process. The Court bolstered its conclusion by citing the
report's explicit statement that "checkers . . . directly involved,
. . . are covered.""4 The Court declared, however, that the rede-

fined unloading process was not relevant to Caputo's case. Here
the Court emphasized "another dominant theme"5 which covers
employees who would have been covered by the old Act for "part
of their activity." In construing this phrase, the Court announced
that the Act focuses primarily on occupations, particularly longshoring, and expresses Congress' desire to provide longshoremen
"continuous coverage throughout their employment." Since Caputo spent at least some of his time in indisputably longshoring
operations as a member of a stevedoring gang, and since the old
Act covered the part of that job that was performed over navigable
water, Caputo is, at a minimum, covered when physically handling
cargo on the waterfront.
The instant case serves two valuable functions. First, by relying
on the legislative history and the purposes of the Act, while ignoring the text per se, the Court has set the goal of seeking practical,
not technical, solutions. Second, the Court has neatly defined
"unloading" by grouping all tasks which modem technology has
added to the cargo's ship-to-consignee movement. The unanimous
acceptance of these concepts by the Court makes it unlikely that
they will be successfully assailed, whatever their logical flaws. 6 A
range of interpretations of the amendments is supportable because
53.
54.
55.
56.

97 S. Ct. at 2356, 2360; S. REP. No. 1125, supra note 8, at 13.
See text accompanying note 48 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 2361.
See, e.g., I.T.O. Corp. v. Ben. Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1095 (4th Cir. 1975)

(Craven, J., dissenting).
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the issue is no longer constitutional, the statute is vague, and the
committee reports are ambiguous.57 For the same reasons, the
Court has more freedom to choose a clear and efficient interpretation. Therefore, a constructive evaluation of the instant decision
should analyze the extent to which the Court has used the opportunity to avoid confusion landward of the Jensen line. Unfortunately, the Court has left much of the issue to be relitigated. Under
the Blundo analysis, coverage of a checker as an "integral part"
of the unloading process cannot be deduced from the major premise that Congress intended to cover acts equivalent to those traditionally done on ship. The job of "checker" is traditionally not
performed on ship. By warping its otherwise clear syllogism to
encompass "explicitly" covered checkers, the Court leaves to lower
courts the unenviable task of defining the term "integral." Some
"theoretic illogic"" is compelled by the ambiguous committee reports, but this concession should not be expanded beyond checkers.59 On the other hand, the holding in Caputo's case is unclear
and ineffective. The Court's major premise is that those who spend
"at least some of their time in indisputably longshoring operations" are "longshoremen" and have, therefore, "continuous coverage throughout their employment."6 This is unclear for two reasons. First, it gives no guidance regarding the minimum time sufficient to qualify as "at least some" time." Second, the holding
57. See, e.g., 529 F.2d at 1088 (discussing the ambiguity of the congressional
reports).
58. See text at note 27 supra.
59. Professor Larson suggests that the "stopping point" will be clerical work
"essential" to handling cargo in maritime commerce. A. LASON, supranote 8, at
§ 89.45(g). This, however, is nothing more than a "clerical but maritime" test and
would cause the same problems as did the Rohde "maritime but local" test. See
notes 17 and 22 supra.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2363. The desire for continuous coverage is not so obvious as
the Court suggests. See, e.g:, Maritime Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d
900, 902 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nor. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212 (1969) (workers "continually passfing] back and forth between ship and
wharf during a given operation"). [Emphasis added]. The 1972 amendments
were a reaction to that problem. "Ordinarily the question of whether a person is
engaged in 'maritime employment' is to be determined as of 'the time of the
accident."' I.T.O. Corp. v. Ben Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d at 1084, citing Pennsylvania
R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. at 340 and Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244,
247 (1941). Accord, Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir.
1976); Weyerhauser v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975). But see, A.
LARSON, supra note 8, § 89.43 at 16-231-33 attempting to distinguish Parker and
O'Rourke as "not necessarily" controlling.
61. Professor Larson attempts to minimize the difficulty by rhetorically ask-
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inexplicably diverges from the "continuous coverage" rationale,
and more narrowly holds that "longshoremen" performing
physical tasks are covered. Further, the interspersed dicta suggest
that perhaps all workers performing physical tasks are covered.
Neither the holding nor the dicta have a logical basis in the Court's
major premise. The Caputo holding therefore provides no clarity
in advance of relitigation. The holding is also ineffective because
employment agreements can be manipulated to assure each worker
the judicially determined time to sustain "longshoreman" status.2
Thereafter, all workers within the situs will be covered throughout
their employment. Further, qualitative disparity remains. For example, if Caputo were loading a truck along with another man who
always performed that task, and both men were injured in a single
accident, only Caputo would be covered. The Court should have
considered that the "typical example" used to cover Blundo is
intended in the reports as an example of the "part of their activity"
phrase used for Caputo. 3 The Court simply proclaimed the latter
"[alnother dominant theme" and the former "not relevant" to
Caputo. Another possible conclusion is that the two phrases describe only one theme and that the test applied to Blundo is the
sole test of status." Were this construction adopted, workers per65
forming longshoring operations would be covered when that task
takes them onto land. This single test for all workers is consonant
with the purposes of the Act, avoids qualitative disparity by covering every man performing the same task, avoids the potential manipulation to which the Caputo test will be prone, and substitutes
simplicity and clarity for the confused Caputo holding.
Steven A. O'Rourke
ing whether ninety percent is sufficient time. A. LARSON, supra note 8, § 89.43 at
16-234. Though Larson does not acknowledge the definitional problem raised by
a more narrow case, he does concede that once the Court defines the phrase, the
rule "cuts both ways." Id. at 16-236. This view conceeds a return to the artificial
anomaly deplored by Congress after Nacirema and is, to that extent, unacceptable.
62. The Court in the instant case expressed concern over the ability of the
employer to manipulate the point of rest theory. 97 S. Ct. at 2364 n.38.
63. The juxtaposition of the phrases supports this view. See text accompany-

ing note 48 supra.
64. This conclusion is implicit in the holdings of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
Jacksonville Shipyards v. Perdue, 539 F.2d at 539 (5th Cir. 1976); Weyerhauser
v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d at 960 (9th Cir. 1975).

65. See note 60 supra.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES-RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES-ABUSE
OF DOMINANT POSITION-DISCRIMINATORY OR UNFAIR PRICING POLICIES AMONG EEC CUSTOMERS BY A CORPORATION IN A DOMINANT MARKET POSITION INFRINGES ARTICLE 86 OF THE EEC TREATY.

In response to complaints filed in 1974 by fruit companies in
Denmark' and Ireland,2 the Commission of the European Communities began an investigation 3 into the practices of United
Brands Company (UBC)4 in marketing its "Chiquita" brand
bananas in the Common Market (EEC). The Commission sought
to determine whether UBC (as a producer, shipper, importer,
distributor, and ripener) was in a dominant position in the EEC
banana market, and if so, whether UBC infringed article 86 of
the EEC Treaty' by abusing that position through its marketing
practices. In 1975 the Commission, held, that within the Belgo1. Application of Th. Olesen A/S, Valby, Denmark, submitted to the Commission on February 20, 1974, and withdrawn on March 13, 1975. See note 9 infra.
2. Applications of Tropical Fruit Co. and Jack Dolan Ltd., both of Dublin,
and Banana Importers of Ireland, Ltd., Dundalk, Ireland, submitted to the Commission on May 27, 1974. See note 9 infra.
3. Article 14 of EEC Council Regulation No. 17, 5 Q.J. EuR. CoMM. (No.
13/62) 204 (1962); 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2401 at 1731 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation 17], provides the Commission with full investigative powers
necessary for its enforcement of the EEC Treaty, including the authority to examine and copy business records and books, require oral explanations for clarification, and enter and inspect land, premises, and equipment.
4. UBC, formed by the 1970 merger of United Fruit Co. and AMK Corp.
(American Seal-Kap), a major U.S. meat producer, is a large multinational conglomerate with annual sales over $2 billion. Approximately 20% of UBC revenues
are generated by its banana operations which control about 35% of world banana
exports.
5. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. Article 86 of the Treaty
provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

302

[Vol. I0: 301

Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU), Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands, UBC was in a dominant position in
the banana industry and that UBC had abused its position in
four ways: by requiring its distributor/ripeners (D/Rs) to refrain
from the resale of green bananas, by charging dissimilar prices to
its D/Rs for equivalent bananas, by setting prices unfairly in
excess of the true value of the bananas being sold to the D/Rs, and
by arbitrarily refusing to supply "Chiquita" bananas to one of its
principal Danish D/Rs. The Commission imposed a fine' and ordered UBC to cease the infringements' by terminating the resale
restrictions upon its customers and by setting prices in accordance
with the Commission's recommendation that they be at least fifteen percent below the then-current Danish and German prices.
EEC Commission Decision IV/26.699-Chiquita, 19 J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 95) 1, 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9800, at 9775
(1976).
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty prohibits "any abuse by one or
more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it.

.

.as incompatible with the

common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member
States."I An infringement of article 86 exists when it can be shown
that one or more "undertakings" acting as an economic unit within
a "substantial part" of the EEC occupies a "dominant position"
that it "abuses" in such a manner that it "may affect trade"
6. Regulation 17, supra note 3, art. 15, authorizes the Commission to:
(2) impose on enterprises and associations of enterprises fines of from one
thousand to one million units of account. . . where these enterprises, wilfully or through negligence:
(a) have infringed the provisions of . . .Article 86 of the Treaty
In determining the amount of the fine the duration of the infringement shall
be considered in addition to its gravity.

7. Id., art. 3 provides:
(1) If, acting on request, or ex officio, the Commission finds that an enterprise or association of enterprises is infringing Article 85 or Article 86 of the
Treaty, it can by means of a decision oblige the enterprises or associations
of enterprises concerned to put an end to such infringement.
(2) A request to this affect may be submitted by: (a) Member States;
(b) natural and legal persons and associations of persons, who show a justified interest.
(3)

Without prejudice to the other provisions of the present Regulation,

the Commission, before taking the decision mentioned in paragraph 1, may
address to the enterprises or associations of enterprises concerned recommendations designed to put an end to the infringement.
8. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 86.
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within the EEC "Undertaking" is defined in neither the EEC
Treaty nor its implementing Regulations, but it seems to be a
generic term for any legally recognized economic unit that is doing
business or is in trade.10 The Court of Justice extends the notion
to include a parent company not in the EEC on the basis of its
"economic and legal ties" with a subsidiary which is incorporated,
located, or doing business in the EEC.' What constitutes a
"substantial part" of the EEC is also undefined in the EEC Treaty
and its implementing Regulations, but the Court uses the concept
in reference to a case by case determination of a "relevant market"
in either a geographic or an economic sense. In the case of Re the
European Sugar Cartel: Cooperative Vereniging Suiher Unic UA
and Others v. Comm 'n Eur. Comm.12 the Court listed as factors to
be considered in determining the substantiality of a particular
market "the pattern and volume of the production and consumption of the said product as well as the habits and economic opportunities of vendors and purchasers." Belgium and the southern
portion of Germany were determined to be "substantial parts" of
the EEC with respect to the sugar industry because of the volume
of sugar production in relation to consumption and because of the
high cost of transportation in relation to production costs, both of
which lead to a predominantly local consumption pattern. 13 The
9. See Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp.
v. Commission Eur. Comm., [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209 at 8800 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Commercial Solvents].
10. J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAw OF THE E.E.C. 47 (1973).
11. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission Eur.
Comm., [1973] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 77, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM.
8171 at 8279-83 (1973). The Court of Justice stated:
MKT. REP. (CCH)
The fact that the subsidiary has its own legal personality is not sufficient
to rule out the possibility that its conduct can be imputed to the parent
company. This applies particularly where the subsidiary does not determine its market conduct autonomously but in the main follows the instructions of the parent company. .

.

. The fact that Continental does not have

its seat in the territory of one of the Member States is not sufficient to
remove this enterprise from the application of Community Law.
Id. at 8298.
12. 17 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 295 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sugar Cartel Case].
13. Id. at 451-52, 463-65. Belgium, with a population of less than ten million,
produces about 10% of the total EEC sugar output and consumes up to 70% of
its own production with the remainder staying predominantly inside Benelux
(BLEU and the Netherlands). The southern sales control region in Germany
produces about 10% of the Common Market sugar output, is nearly as populous
as Benelux, and imports less than 3% of its annual consumption needs.
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nature of the product or service offered is as important in the
determination of substantiality as the geographic expanse of the
undertaking's operations. Whereas in Sugar Cartel'4 the Court held
that Belgium is a substantial part of the EEC with respect to the
sugar industry, in General Motors Continental N. V. v. Commission Eur. Comm.," it held that Belgium is not such a substantial
part of the EEC as to warrant Commission regulation of the
Belgian vehicular safety inspection services. The determination
of substantiality is always interrelated with the Court's determination of the presence of a "dominant position" in the market.
Again, there are no definitions of the term in either the EEC
Treaty or its implementing Regulations. A position of dominance may be, determined by the degree of control or the extent
of the operations of one or several enterprises in a relevant
market. Thus the Court has held that undertakings with control
of 90 percent of the sales and 70 percent of the production in a
regional market are in dominant positions as is an undertaking
that controls 65 percent of a national market. 6 Yet numbers
alone do not establish a basis for the application of EEC law.' 7
The Court has identified three additional factors in the determination of dominance in a market: capacity to act independently of competitors' responses or activities, ability to have a
significant influence on the operation of the market, and knowledge that one has sufficient strength and independence to exert
influence over the market.'" In establishing that there has been
an infringement of article 86 by an undertaking in a dominant
position, the "abuse" of that position is the most significant element. Article 86 lists four market practices that are abusive: direct
or indirect imposition of unfair prices or trading restrictions; limitation of production, markets, or technical development prejudicial to consumers; application of dissimilar conditions or terms to
equivalent transactions with other traders that place them at a
competitive disadvantage; and insertion in contracts of obligations
14. Id. at 451-52, 464-65. The Court adopted the Commission's findings that
the Belgian group controlled 85%, rather than the admitted 65%, of the Belgian
sugar market. Id. at 452.
15. [1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320 at 7727-29, 773435 (1975).
16. J. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 10, at 102.
17. Commercial Solvents Case, supra note 10.
18. See Sugar Cartel Case, 17 Comm. MKT. L.R. 295 (1975); Europemballage
Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission Eur. Comm., [1973] C.J. Comm.
E. Rec. 77, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8171 at 827983 (1973).
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that are immaterial to the contract subject matter.'9 In a Commission Memorandum the Commission added three other practices:
a merger or consolidation that results in the elimination of other
competition, price slashing to a level that eventually would eliminate competition, and any other "cut-throat" practices designed
to force a competitor into an unfavorable or undesirable merger."0
In Commercial Solvents, a decision that appears to apply both the
Treaty prohibition against prejudicial market limitation and the
Commission criterion of cut-throat practices, the Court held that
"refusal to supply" is also an abuse prohibited by EEC restrictive
practices law. 2 ' This holding implies that once a dominant supplier
begins servicing a competitor, it cannot thereafter refuse to supply
him if the refusal results in the elimination of that competitor from
the market. 2 In the Sugar Cartel Case the Court expanded the
concept of prejudicial market limitations in article 86 by holding
that "market segregation" through the imposition of import or
export restrictions is an abuse if a dominant position is thereby
consolidated or if it results in a discriminatory limitation of EEC
competition.? Restrictive practices alone do not necessitate a finding of an infringement of article 86; rather the use of a dominant
position to the detriment of EEC competition is what is prohibited.2 4 The language of article 86 clearly suggests that the domi19. See note 5 supra.
20. Commission Memorandum P-1/66, Concentrationof Firms in the Common Market, 2 CoMm. MKT. RPP. (CCH) 9081 at 8173 (1966).
21. [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8209 at 8800, 8820 (1974).
22. The competitor had cancelled his contract with the parent supplier and
its subsidiary before the parent decided to stop supplying the EEC. The competitor brought this complaint to the Commission only after all the other sources for
the needed chemicals had dried up and after he realized that he had to recontract
for supplies with the Commercial Solvents group. Only then did he discover the
change in the supplier's policy concerning the EEC. Id. at 8802-03. This decision
forcing a supplier to service an ex-customer poses some interesting questions.
Three of these questions are: whether the termination of supply can ever be
justified absent a lack of materials, whether the customer is guaranteed his supplies forever, and whether the decision applies only to prior (or currrent) customers. J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 62-63, 275-76 (Supp.
1975).
23. 17 COMM. MKT. L.R. at 457, 467-69.
24. Thus, the quotas and limitations effectively imposed upon exporters by
the principal refinery doing buisness in Belgium was held to be an abuse, while
the marketing restrictions maintained between particular German producer
groups and various vendor/distributors establishing sales regions and exclusive
dealerships were found not to be an infringement of this principle. Id. at 469-70.
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nant position is merely the instrument by which an enterprise
takes advantage of the market or competition. In ContinentalCan,
however, the Court held that the strengthening of a dominant
position alone is a prohibited abuse.25 In other words, under article
86 the Commission may change the structure of competition as
well as the use of the structure." Thus, when mergers involve an
undertaking in a dominant position, they can be prohibited by the
Commission even though article 86 does not so state. 27 In
Commercial Solvents,2" the Court found both direct and indirect
potential effects on the "competitive structure within the Common
Market" to be sufficient for a finding of an article 86 violation.
Presumably this "effects" doctrine is limited to substantial or appreciable effects and is not so broad as to include all detrimental
consequences 2 or the inadvertant elimination of an insignificant
competitor. Once the Commission determines that article 86 has
been infringed,3" it has the authority under Regulation 17/62 to
order the termination of the abuse in whatever manner it
25.

[1972] C.J. CoMm. E. REC. 77, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT.

REP. (CCH) at 8300-01.

26.

For a detailed analysis of the Court's holding on this point, see J.

CUNNINGHAM,

supra note 10, at 261-63.

27. Immediately after the Continental Can decision, the Commission submitted to the EEC Council a draft proposal authorizing Commission regulation over
planned mergers and market concentrations, ostensibly to clarify its control over
the structural modifications involved therein, but arguably to extend the power
of the Commission into an area that article 86 does not expressly cover. Proposal
for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings.
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 92) 1 (1973), salient portions reprinted in J. CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 10, at 371-74.
28. [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) at 8820-22. The Court held that it was "immaterial" that the competitor's EEC trade was minimal (about six percent of gross sales) and declining so
long as the market structure within the EEC would be altered by its elimination
as a consequence of the monopolistic suppliers' refusal to deal.
29. Cf. General Motors Continental N.V. v. Commission Eur. Comm., [1975
Transfer Binder] CosM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8320 at 7735 (1975). Only five
specific instances of excessive pricing were charged by the Commission.
30. The five decisions in which the Commission found an infringement of
article 86 are: General Motors Continental N.V. v. Commission Eur. Comm.,
[1975 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8320 (1975); Sugar Cartel
Case, 17 Comm. MKT. L.R. 295 (1975); Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm'n Eur. Comm., [1974]. C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209 at 8800 (1974);
Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission Eur. Comm.,
[1973] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 77, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8171 at 8279-83 (1973); Re GEMA, 10 COMM. MKT. L.R. D35 (1971).
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"recommends" as most appropriate, 3 to impose a fine of up to one
million units of account, 32 and to charge a periodic penalty of up
to 1000 units of account per day for delay in complying with the
termination order.3 Regulation 17/62 grants the Commission unlimited discretion in formulating its "recommendations" for the
termination of an infringement of article 86. In Commercial
Solvents, the only case in which this exercise of discretion resulted
in any theoretical problems, the Court affirmed a Commission
recommendation for a non-EEC enterprise to supply an EEC competitor with a sufficient amount of material to make competition
with the supplier's EEC subsidiary in the market "economically
feasible" even though the EEC market was relatively unimportant
for both EEC companies. 4 Consequently, the competitor received
a substantial portion of the material necessary for world-wide competition with the supplier in order to make competition locally
with the EEC subsidiary feasible. This demonstrates the broad
impact a Commission decision can have beyond the Common Market.
In the instant case, the Commission determined that United
Brands Co. (UBC) was an undertaking with a dominant position
in the EEC banana market, that UBC had abused its position in
four ways affecting competition in the EEC market, and that UBC
had therefore infringed article 86 of the EEC Treaty.35 According
to the Commission, UBC is an undertaking for the purposes of
article 86 because it is the parent of United Brands Continental,
B.V., which is located in Rotterdam and which coordinates most
of UBC's Common Market banana operations, although it merely
implements UBC instructions and policy. 6 The Commission established that the relevant economic market was limited to bananas because no other fruit is a satisfactory substitute to consumers who generally prefer bananas, even when less expensive fruit
is available. 37 The Commission limited the relevant geographic
31.

See note 7 supra.

32. The unit of account is determined by budgetary regulation pursuant to
articles 207 and 209 of the EEC Treaty and generally approximates the value of
the U.S. dollar.
33. Regulation 17, supra note 3, art. 16.
34. [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT.
REP. (CCH) at 8822-23.
35. 19 J.O. EuR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1, (1976), [1975 Transfer Binder] Comm.
MKT. REP. (CCH)
9800 at 9774 (1975).
36. Id. at 9776, 9785.
37. Id. at 9785.
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market to BLEU and the Netherlands (Benelux), Denmark, Ireland, and Germany where it is not under the Scipio group, because
the market conditions in these areas are virtually identical and
clearly distinguishable from those in the remainder of the EEC. 8
Although UBC controls only 45 percent of the EEC sales volume,
the Commission determined that it had a dominant position in the
banana market because the strong vertical integration 39 of its operations and the substantial Margin between its share of sales and
that of its closest competitors 4 gave UBC the requisite capacity for
both independent action and the exertion of significant influence
on the market.' This evaluation by the Commission is supported
38. UBC is as active in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, but distinguishable factors in those markets are import arrangements, trading conditions,
and the marketing of different kinds of bananas produced in different parts of the
world. The Commission also weighed heavily the role of the Rotterdam subsidiary
in the operations of the markets in the five countries ultimately selected and the
use of the two ports for the greater bulk of banana deliveries to those same
countries. Id. at 9785-86. The Scipio group in Germany represents better than
three-quarters of UBC sales in Germany but is excluded from the Commission's
deliberations and from this comment because the group purchases its bananas
from UBC under significantly different terms and conditions from other D/Rs as
a result of an historical relationship between Scipio and UBC. Among the factors
most significant in the eyes of the Commission were that Scipio uses its own ships
for the transport of bananas from Latin America and that its prices were f.o.b.
Latin American port of origin rather than the usual UBC practice of setting prices
f.o.r. European port of destination. Id. at 9779, 9782.
39,

See note 4 supra.

40. UBC's principal competitors and their shares of the EEC banana market
are Castle & Cook (9%), Del Monte (5%), the "Alba" group (5%), the "Belhoba"
group (5%), and Geest Industries Ltd. (6%). These five competitors combined still
only have two-thirds of the share held by UBC. [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) at 9780-81.
41. Id. at 9785-87. The Commission stated:
Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to
behave independently without taking into account, to any substantial extent, their competitors, purchasers and suppliers. Such is the case where
an undertaking's market share, either in itself or when combined with its
know-how, access to raw materials, capital or other major advantage such
as trademark ownership, enables it to determine the prices or to control the
production or distribution of a significant part of the relevant goods. It is
not necessary for the undertaking to have total dominance such as would
deprive all other market participants of their commercial freedom, as long
as it is strong enough in general terms to devise its own strategy as it wishes,
even if there are differences in the extent to which it dominates individual
submarkets.
Id. at 9785.

Spring 1977]

RECENT DECISIONS

by the effective conversion of the industry's processing technology
and sales methods after UBC introduced the "Chiquita" brand.
Having found UBC to be in a dominant position in the EEC banana market, the Commission determined that four UBC practices
abused that position. The Commission held that UBC pricing
practices amounted to abuses of the express provisions of article
86 (a) and (b) .42 Based on both the minimal differences between
UBC's branded and unbranded bananas and the significantly
lower prices charged by UBC for "Chiquita" bananas in Ireland
than elsewhere in the EEC, the Commission held that the pricing
of "Chiquita" bananas 30 to 40 percent above its unbranded bananas was an "unfairly excessive" margin. 3 The Commission concluded that at least half of the price difference was unjustifiable,
and therefore abusive under article 86(a) 4 Also, the Commission
determined that UBC applied unjustifiably dissimilar prices in
substantially equivalent transactions, thereby abusing its position
under article 86(c). UBC set its prices on a country-by-country
basis although the terms of the sales always quoted the price as
f.o.r. (free on rail) port of destination (either Rotterdam or Bremerhaven). The discrepancy in the prices paid by the D/Rs in Germany, Benelux, and Denmark ranged as high as 50 percent in spite
of UBC delivering bananas produced, packaged, and transported
under- identical conditions. 5 The Commission went further and
42. See note 5 supra.
43. 19 J.O. EuR. COMM. (No. L 95) 1, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
RsP. (CCH) at 9778, 9782-83, 9788-89. Because UBC packages its bananas at the
time they are picked or harvested, it is possible that by the time they reach the
retail outlets there will be a larger difference between ripe and unripe, or between
clean and damaged bananas of the same brand, than there will be between separate brands which are generally distinguished by length or curvature at the time
of harvest. Prices in Ireland for "Chiquita" bananas are c.i.f. Dublin and thus
include the substantial amount required to insure and transport the goods across
the land and through channels from the port of destination to Dublin, yet these
prices run as much as 60% below the average BLEU price. UBC still admits the
possibility of profit even at the low rates suggested herein.
44.

Id. at 9789. UBC argued unsuccessfully that the price differences are

attributable to the additional advertising and promotional costs generated by the
marketing of bananas by brand name. The Commission observed, however, that
other competitors consistently priced their own brand name bananas below the
UBC levels even when the competitor lacked the cost-efficient market integration
enjoyed by UBC (although the depressed prices may be partially due to the
inferior quality or lack of uniformity that may result without the market integration).
45. Id. at 9782-83, 9788. The discrepancy is most pronounced when the Irish
price is compared with the Danish price; at one time the c.i.f. Dublin price
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held that this systematic setting of prices at the highest tolerable
level in each segment of a market intentionally segregated by an
undertaking in a dominant position was an abuse of UBC's position because it could not justify the price discrepancy by reference
to variations in the market structure or production costs.48 The
Commission said it was not satisfied that UBC's desire to maximize profits by setting its prices as high as the market would bear
was an "objective justification" for the UBC price schedule." Furthermore, the Commission found another abuse by UBC in the
"market segregation" itself. UBC maintained country-by-country
segregation by prohibiting the resale of green bananas through
restrictive clauses in the supply contracts with the D/Rs and
through sales agreements permitting sale to consumers only within
a narrow period of specified ripeness. The Commision again was
not satisfied with the UBC explanation for these restrictions-that
they were necessary to insure the consumer of both quality and
uniformity in the "Chiquita" brand-and looked to the broader
effects of the restrictions."8 The Commission held these restrictions
and the resulting market segregation to be an infringement of article 86 because their practical consequence was a complete ban on
competition among EEC members in the banana market. The
Commission found two of the UBC restrictions on its D/Rs unacceptable. First, D/Rs could not compete with other D/Rs and UBC
for the retail trade in other countries because the fully-ripened
bananas UBC would allow to be exported from country to country
were too highly perishable to make the trade economically feasible.
Second, D/Rs could not enter the "Chiquita" market in the first
place unless they had access to the sophisticated ripening facilities
necessary for the UBC-approved preparation of the bananas for
resale to consumers.49 The Commission found the resultant market
segregation facilitated UBC's discriminatory price structure as
well as other market-controlling behavior.50 Finally, the Commission investigated UBC's relationship with one of its principal Danish D/Rs and held that UBC's refusal to supply the D/R with
(including insurance and ground transportation) was 72% below the Danish Lo.r.
Bremerhaven price (not including the additional insurance and transportation

costs).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 9788.
Id.
Id. at 9778, 9781-82, 9787.
Id. [1975 Transfer Binder] at 9787.
See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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"Chiquita" bananas for sixteen months was an abuse. UBC had
responded to the D/R's trade in a competitor's brand by gradually
cutting off the D/R's access to supplies of "Chiquita" bananas. The
Commission said this interfered with market competition by discouraging "Chiquita" dealers from selling non-UBC brands." Having determined that UBC market practices infringed article 86 in
at least four ways, the Commission imposed the maximum fine of
one million units of account ($1.168 million). The decision was
based on three grounds: UBC was at least negligent in not realizing
the anti-competitive effects of its marketing policies, the abuses
had lasted since 1967, and UBC had persisted in consolidating its
already significant dominant position in the banana market. The
Commission noted that UBC had notified the Commission since
1968 of the sales restrictions on green bananas, that UBC had
voluntarily terminated the refusal-to-supply infringement, and
that this was the Commission's first full consideration of pricing
policies and article 86. The Commission concluded that a moderate fine would be appropriate and that maximum million-unit fine
was "moderate" in view of the high profitability of UBC's banana
market practices and the $50 million value of UBC's annual EEC
trade.-" The Commission also ordered UBC to cease its violation
of article 86 by terminating its restrictions on the resale of green
bananas and by establishing a uniform Common Market pricing
schedule that would be neither discriminatory nor excessive. The
specific price level recommended by the Commission was "at least
fifteen per cent below that of the prices currently charged to its
customers in Denmark and Germany."53 The Commission denied
that it was assuming the function of a pricing board and stressed
that it was UBC's responsibility to fix particular prices in accordance with production costs and general fairness. The Commission
did, however, require UBC to submit periodic reports detailing the
prices actually charged to its customers for "Chiquita" bananas.
Finally, to compel compliance with its orders, the Commission
51. Id. [1975 Transfer Binder] at 9783-85, 9789-90. The D/R (who was the
complainant at note 1 supra) had first participated in a UBC competitor's sales
promotion campaign similar to the ones frequently employed by UBC. Eventually
the D/R became the exclusive Danish outlet for the competitor's brand and UBC
thereafter terminated deliveries of its "Chiquita" brand. The D/R had invested
heavily in the UBC "Chiquita" technology and needed the "Chiquita" business.
UBC again supplied the D/R after the commencement of the Commission's investigation.
52. Id. [1975 Transfer Binder] at 9790-91.
53. Id. at 9792.
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imposed the maximum periodic penalty of 1000 units per day in
the event that UBC delayed in complying with the Commission
Decisions." The Court of Justice has issued an interim order suspending the Commission's sanctions pending the outcome of the
substantive appeal filed by UBC.
Four of the five prior cases in which the Commission found an
infringement of article 86 were appealed to the Court of Justice."
The Court agreed with the Commission as to the legal theories
espoused in at least three of the four cases, yet it affirmed in full
only one of the Commission Decisions while overturning two others
outright. The Court seems to consent to expanding regulation of
anti-competitive practices under article 86 but limits the extent to
which sanctions are applied in those cases where the Commission
first expands the application of article 86. With so few previous
Commission Decisions dealing with article 86, the instant case is
significant. It reaffirms the trend towards expanded regulation of
anti-competitive practices through article 86 and Regulation 17 in
two ways. The case further develops the "refusal to supply" and
the "market segregation" doctrines not specifically enumerated in
article 86 or its attendant proclamations and regulations. It also
provides the first Commission analysis of how pricing policies will
be determined to be abusive within the enumerated guidelines of
article 86. The principles of competitive policy upon which the
Commission bases its increasingly active regulation of the marketplace are consistent and should receive the support of the Court
on appeal. Further, the instant decision is significant in exposing
the Commission's method of determining that UBC has a dominant position in the banana market. The Commission's use of the
"capacity for independent action" and "capacity to exert substantial influence" doctrines was not unique, but it is notable that
these factors were sufficient to find that an undertaking with less
than a majority share of the market is nonetheless in a dominant
position. In none of the BLEU nations did UBC's share of the
banana market exceed 45 percent and in the German market the
Commission excluded three-quarters of UBC's share because it
54. Id.
55. The four cases appealed are those which have been discussed herein. They
are (with the court's action and position): Commercial Solvents (affirmed outright), Continental Can (annulled only on the facts, the legal theory was supported), Sugar Cartel (sanctions were substantially modified, the legal theory was
supported), and General Motors Corp. (annulled but arguably the legal theory
was supported).
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was under the control of the Scipio group. Since anti-competitive
practices under article 86 are only prohibited if the undertaking is
in a dominant position, the Court might annul the Commission
Decision on the grounds that UBC could not have known its practices were illegal until it had some notice that it might be in a
dominant position despite its less-than-majority share of the market. The Court's ruling on appeal will be critically important to
other undertakings doing business in the EEC. In applying the
specific performance sanction of Regulation 17 for only the second
time, the Commission was affirming the use of both prescriptions
and proscriptions in regulating anti-competitive market practices,
and it added a new tool for active regulation in the market
place-a mandatory reporting scheme, here used to check on
UBC's pricing policies. There is no reason for the Court not to
permit this development, and as a result the instant case provides
for a more flexible system of regulating market practices. Finally,
the Commission's attempt to establish guidelines for UBC pricing
is most significant. 6 Although the Commission stressed that it was
not setting itself up as a price control board, the recommendation
of a maximum price level operates in exactly that fashion. The
determination that a price is unfair, excessive, prejudicial, or abusive requires less thorough knowledge of a particular market than
does the establishment of a specific price requirement or limitation. Although the former is a logical function of the Commission,
the latter seems beyond its expertise. Thus, the Commission could
determine that UBC's pricing policy needed modification but may
find itself seriously jeopardizing the market when it determines
what specific price is justifiable and proceeds to enforce it.
Henry Clay Wood, Jr.
56. There are two conflicting purposes in the policy underlying the EEC, both
of which are reflected in the name "Common Market." "Market" suggests free
competition among its participants and it is this notion with which the UBC
decision deals, namely termination of anti-competitive activity. On the other
hand, "community" suggests consolidation of efforts among participants for a
strengthened and unified activity, and insofar as this consolidation is anticompetitive there will be a constant antagonism between the two Common Market principles of consolidation and competition. Every Court decision and Commission ruling, therefore, is significant insofar as it shifts the prevailing policy
closer toward one or the other of these principles.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION-STATE

REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
TO ENJOIN STATE
JURISDICTION
HAVE
COMMERCE-FEDERAL COURTS
OFFICIALS FROM ENFORCING STATE LAWS REGULATING INTERSTATE
TANKER TRADE WHERE CONGRESS INTENDED THAT FEDERAL REGULATIONS PRE-EMPT THE AREA

Plaintiffs, Atlantic Richfield Company and Seatrain Lines,
Inc.,' sued named officials 2 of the State of Washington to enjoin
enforcement of the state's Tanker Law.3 The State of Washington
in 1975 enacted laws regulating oil tankers with the intent of decreasing the likelihood of oil spills on the Puget Sound.4 The laws
prohibited supertankers5 not complying with the requirements of
the statute from entering the Puget Sound or its adjacent waters.'
Furthermore, the laws required oil tankers above a certain size 7 to
employ pilots licensed by the State of Washington,8 and required
vessels lacking certain safety and maneuvering capabilities' to be
1. Plaintiffs are United States corporations engaged in the transportation of

oil to and from domestic and international ports.
2. The state officials named in plaintiff's brief are: Daniel J. Evans, Governor
of the State of Washington; Slade Gordon, Attorney General of the State of
Washington; William C. Jacobs, Chairman, and Harry A. Greenwood, Benjamin
W. Joyce, Philip H. Luther, and J.Q. Paull, Members, Board of Pilotage Commissioners; and David S. McEachran, Whatcom County Prosecuting Attorney.
3. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 88.16.170 to 88.16.190 (Supp. 1976) (The Tanker Law).
Jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. 1337, which provides: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against
restraints and monopolies."
4. The new laws require tankers to have collision avoidance radar, double
bottoms, twin screens and other safety equipment, and in the alternative to be
escorted by tugs.
5. Supertankers are a class of large oil tankers, statutorily defined as any oil
tanker that is larger than 125,000 deadweight tons. WASH.

REv.

CODE §

88.16.190(1) (Supp. 1976).
6.

Id.

7. The laws apply to all oil tankers, whether enrolled or registered, of 50,000
deadweight tons or greater. Id. § 88.16.180.
8. Washington provides for the procurement of state pilot licenses via state
exams in addition to those provided by the United States where the statutes so
authorize.
9. "An oil tanker . . of 40 to 125 thousand deadweight tons may proceed
beyond the points enumerated in subsection (1) if such tanker possesses all of the
following standard safety features:
(a) Shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each two and onehalf deadweight tons; and
(b) Twin screws; and
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escorted by tugs' while navigating in the defined waters. Plaintiffs
asserted that the state laws were pre-empted by federal regulation," violated the Commerce Clause,' 2 and invaded the foreign
affairs powers' 3 of the United States. Defendents contended that
the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under the judicial doctrine of
abstention'4 and that the congressional policy of "cooperative federalism"'" precluded plaintiffs' asserting any federal pre-emption.'
(c) Double Bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid cargo compartments;
and
(d) Two radars in working order and operating, one of which must be
collision avoidance radar; and
(e) Such other navigational position location system as may be prescribed
from time to time by the board of pilotage commissioners . ...

Id. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1976).
10. The statute requires that such tankers shall be under escort of a tug or
tugs with an aggregate shaft horsepower equivalent of five percent of the deadweight tons of that tanker. See id. § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
11. See note 3 supra.
12. "The Congress shall have power. . . to regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. The regulation of foreign commerce is exclusively within the powers of the
federal government. The plaintiffs claimed that by the very nature of such power
it would be inconsistent with the national interest to allow each state to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. See Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
14. The abstention doctrine is a response to the problems caused by the existence of two sets of courts, state and federal, with authority'to adjudicate questions
of state and federal law. Federal district court abstention has been especially
important and controversial in suits challenging state action on federal
grounds-suits made more readily possible by the nationalizing impacts of postCivil War amendments, the enactment of civil rights laws, and the 1908 Supreme
Court decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Congress was asked to
curtail that jurisdiction, but the legislative restrictions imposed were of limited
scope. Beginning in 1940, Court-developed doctrines have created significant additional restraints on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.
15. "Cooperative federalism" has been the congressional policy for designing
a United States environmental policy. The Congress funded and encouraged the
coastal states to design comprehensive and forward-looking coastal management
plans. See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp.
V 1975). Congress has invoked "cooperative federalism"-or at least some state
involvement-in virtually all of its water-related regulatory programs: e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970 & Supp. V 1976); The Estuarine Act of 1968, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (1970); The Deep Water Ports Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 150124 (Supp. V 1975).
16. The Secretary of Commerce can approve a state's coastal management
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The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, held, for the plaintiff. The federal courts have jurisdiction
to enjoin state officers from enforcing state laws regulating the oil
tanker industry because Congress intended that the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 197217 pre-empt state regulation in the
area. Atlantic Richfield Company v. Evans, No. 75-648 (W.D.
Wash., decided April -, 1977).
When a state law or action is challenged as violative of some
federal right, federal courts may enjoin the state officer, though not
the state, from enforcing the state law in question. In Ex parte
Young"8 the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment 9
barred federal courts from rendering any judgment in private suits
against a state." The Court established, however, that neither the
eleventh amendment nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented an action to enjoin a state officer from applying a state law
that violated a right arising either under the Constitution or
United States statutes and treaties.2" Congress responded by enacting statutes that restricted the application of Young, thereby
giving rise to the concept of abstention. The abstention doctrine
was first enunciated in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 22 In
Pullman the Court upheld a federal district court's refusal to issue
an injunction against the Texas Railroad Commission until the
state courts had had an opportunity to void the Commission's
action on state law grounds. The Court reasoned that such a solution would avoid possible federal-state friction prompted by a tentative and premature adjudication2 in the federal court. The Court
further added that federal injunctive relief would be granted only
in "special circumstances to prevent irreparable injury which is
plan (thereby making it eligible for federal funding) only if "the views of Federal
agencies principally affected by such program[s] have been adequately considered." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (1970).
17. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. V 1975).
18. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
19. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
20. The broad power conferred by Article III of the Constitution has been
modified in part by the eleventh amendment.
21. 209 U.S. at 123.
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman, black porters alleged that a state railroad
commission denied them their jobs on racial grounds by requiring conductors to
be put in charge of all sleeping cars.
23. Id. at 500.
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clear and imminent."24 This abstention by federal courts was most
notable in four decisions handed down on June 8, 1959.1 The Court
established another "prerequisite" of a grant of federal injunctive
relief: that the state court remedies be inadequate, or alternatively
that the litigant have exhausted his state court remedies.28 In
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,n abstention was ordered on the ground that there was a special danger of state-federal
friction that could be avoided by first obtaining state court clarification on an unclear point of state law. Thibodeaux, however, was
the high water mark of the federal court's flexibility in the abstention doctrine, because in Zwickler v. Koota28 the Court shifted
noticeably by removing the federal court's equitable discretion to
abstain in all cases involving freedom of expression and first
amendment rights. Abstention, therefore, has historically served
three functions: the avoidance of unnecessary friction between federal courts and the states; the avoidance of unnecessary rulings on
constitutional questions; and the avoidance of error in construing
24. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). In this case, the
Court upheld a federal district court's refusal to enjoin the application of a city
ordinance to certain religious solicitation, even though the ordinance was held
unconstitutional the same day by the Court in reviewing a criminal conviction
under it. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Court later explained its actions by stating: "Since injunctive relief looks to the future, and it
was not alleged that Pennsylvania courts and prosecutors would fail to respect
the Murdock ruling, the Court found nothing to justify an injunction." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
25. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959);
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mushuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
26. The requirement of exhausting state remedies provided a rationale for the
federal district court's abstention in Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 993
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). But see Turner v.
City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1952) (abstention which had been ordered only
because state declaratory judgment remedy had not been exhausted). The first
exception to the Ex parte Young federal injunction doctrine was that a litigant
must have first exhausted his state remedies. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210 (1908). The rationale for this exception was that this would avoid
federal-state friction. Id. at 230. This same rationale was applied in Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941). Similarly, in certain cases,
litigants attempting to remove an action from a state court to a federal court were
not allowed to show that the state court remedies were inadequate.
27. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
28. 389 U.S. 241 (1967). In Zwickler the Court extended and clarified the first
amendment exception to the abstention doctrine by holding that a federal court
has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of a declaratory request
if the state statute is constitutionally attacked as void for overbreadth.
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a state law. Accordingly, the present rule requires that when a
federal constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question
of state law, the federal court should abstain from acting in order
to provide the state courts an opportunity to settle the underlying
state-law question. The federal court would thus avoid any unnecessary decision on a constitutional question.29 Nevertheless, this
rule is qualified by the Court's warning that because of delays
inherent in the abstention process and the danger that valuable
federal rights might be lost in the absence of expeditious adjudication in the federal court, jurisdiction may be invoked in "special
circumstances," upon careful consideration of the facts in each
case." Parallel to the abstention doctrine in the area of federalstate law interaction is the problem raised by pre-emption, as it
applies to the Commerce Clause. In granting Congress the power
to "regulate Commerce . . .among the several States,"' 3' the Constitution neither expressly excludes nor reserves a concurrent
power in the states. Although initially it was thought that the
power to regulate interstate commerce resided exclusively in the
Congress and all state regulation was impliedly prohibited, 32 this
doctrine of exclusivity was quickly superceded by a doctrine of
concurrent state and federal power. The concurrent power doctrine
recognizes that a state, in the face of congressional silence, may
regulate an aspect of interstate commerce that does not require
29. Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 84 (1975). In
Harris County appellee justices of the peace and constables, threatened with
removal before their elected terms expired, brought this action in federal court.
The suit challenged, on due process and equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of a Texas statute providing, inter alia, that When the boundaries of
certain precincts are changed and more than the allotted number of justices of
the peace and constables reside within the changed district, the offices shall
become vacant and shall be filled as are other vacancies. A three-judge federal
district court held that the statute violated equal protection by removing some
county officers but not others and ordered appellee officials' reinstatement. The
Court held that in view of the unsettled state of Texas law as to whether the state
constitutional provisions ensure justices of the peace and constables tenure until
their elected terms expire even when the challenged statute would require their
ouster, the district court should have abstained from deciding the federal constitutional issue, since it was far from certain under Texas precedent that appellee
officeholders would lose their jobs or that the reinstatement relief ordered by the
district court would be available.
30. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See generally F. RIGGLE, STATE AND NATIONAL
POWER OVER COMMERCE (1937); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power,
27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
32. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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uniformity of regulation,33 unless doing so would discriminate
against34 or burden the free flow of commerce to an extent not
justified by local benefit to the state.3 5 Congress may also provide
that an area within its jurisdiction be regulated exclusively by the
states. 6 Furthermore, Congress may also exclude the states from
regulating any aspect of interstate commerce." Thus, whenever
Congress exercises its commerce power, a state statute will be
invalid if it either conflicts with the federal legislation 38 or intrudes
into a field Congress intended to occupy exclusively. 39 In the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to pre-empt state
regulation, courts face the difficult problem of defining "the
field"" of regulation and determining whether Congress intended
pre-emption, 4 ' or whether state legislation can function without
impairing the policy underlying related federal enactments." Since
Congress usually legislates against a background of state law,43
courts are reluctant to conclude pre-emption was intended." Furthermore, even absent express intention by Congress to pre-empt,
state legislation that duplicates a pervasive federal scheme having
national uniformity as its objective has been held invalid.45 State
33. See, e.g., Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). See
generally, Dunham, Congress, The States and Commerce, 8 J. PUB.L. 47 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
35. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
36. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
37. See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
38. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2. See Hill v. Florida ex. rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538
(1945); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
39. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). Cf. Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
40. See generally, Note, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
41. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947); H.P.
Welch v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912).
42. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson,
325 U.S. 538 (1945). See Dunham, supra note 38, at 52.
43. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
435 (1953).
44. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446
(1960); Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749 (1942).
45. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Rice v. Santa
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statutes which are not duplicative but concern subjects not covered by federal law have been upheld as complementary legislation
as long as no direct conflict with the federal regulatory scheme
appears likely.4" When directed toward local problems, such state
statutes have been sustained because the state and federal legislation differ in their purposes 7 or operate in different regulatory
spheres. Thus, if there is no federal pre-emption, the states maintain power to control local matters that may in some degree affect
interstate commerce, 9 provided the exercise of this power neither
discriminates in favor of local commerce 0 nor unreasonably burdens the free flow of interstate commerce." In determining the
constitutionality of state regulations alleged to be a burden on the
free flow of commerce, a court must carefully weigh 2 the effectiveness of such regulations in promoting legitimate local interests
against the extent to which the regulations restrict the movement
of commerce or interfere with uniform regulation. 3 State laws designed to improve working conditions of employees54 and to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of the community55 have been sustained as reasonable exercises of state police power. More recently,
the Supreme Court upheld a state law imposing strict liability in
tort on coastal oil spillers, finding that the Federal Water Quality
Improvement Act was concerned only with recovery of actual
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
46. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). See International Association of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
47. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Huron Portland Cement Co. v.
City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
48. Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 208 (1944).
49. Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
50. Compare Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (restriction on sale of non-local milk invalid), and H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949) (refusal of license to out-of-state buyer invalid), with Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (natural gas production
law valid), and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (agricultural production and
marketing act valid).
51. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
52. See, Dowling, InterstateCommerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 547, 549 (1947) (emphasizes discretion).
53. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945).
54. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1
(1943).
55. E.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445-48
(1960) (smoke control ordinance); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S.
453 (1911) (full crews required on trains); Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888)
(medical examination of engineers).
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clean-up costs incurred by the federal government and presupposed a coordinated federal-state effort to deal with coastal oil
pollution. 6 In a related area of regulation, Congress has legislated on aspects of marine navigation. The Port and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)5 7 was primarily designed to regulate
the operations, traffic routes, pilotage, and safety design specifications of tankers. Under the statute, the Coast Guard is
authorized to create traffic control systems and to "control
vessel traffic in areas which it determines to be especially hazardous."!" Title H of the PWSA also empowers the Coast Guard
to "establish comprehensive minimum standards of design,
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance and operation"5 9 of
tankers. In David v. M/V Ester,6 ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a Florida state law requiring
state licensed pilots on certain vessels was pre-empted by federal
statute.' This is the only case interpreting congressional intent
regarding pre-emption and the pervasiveness of federal regulation as applied to the PWSA. 2 It is left to the courts in cases of
this type 3 to construe the relevant statute to determine whether
Congress intended that its regulation pre-empt the field, or
whether it intended to provide a complete national regulation of
the subject matter to the exclusion of any local regulation.64 Where
there is no pre-emption in fact, 5 the court must consider the completeness of the federal regulatory scheme,6" the dominance of fed56. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (1970).
58. Id. § 1221(3).
59. 46 U.S.C. § 391a(1) (Supp. V 1975). See also, 41 Fed. Reg. 15859 (April
15, 1976) (proposed regulations).
60. 509 F.2d 1377 (1975).
61. The federal statutes restricted state regulations as to the licensing of
steam vessel pilots, setting of pilot charges, and the proscription of any fee levy
against any steamer.
62. Title I of the PWSA, however, states that "nothing contained in this title
• . . [shall] prevent a State or political subdivision thereof from prescribing for
structures only higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards than
those which may be prescribed pursuant to this title." 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (Supp.
V 1975) (emphasis added).
63. This refers to cases where the state laws touch on areas in which Congress

has legislated.
64. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
65. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm. of Kansas, 372 U.S. 84
(1963); Farmers Educational Cooperative Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959);
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
66. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
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eral interest in the field, " and the interest in national uniform
regulation. "8
In the instant case, the three judge district court unanimously
decided that it had jurisdiction over the parties under the doctrine
of Ex parte Young. Although the district court did not discuss this
issue in its opinion, it noted that the Supreme Court would have
ample opportunity to reconsider" Young. On the merits of the
case, the court found that federal law pre-empted Section 3(2) of
the Washington Tanker Law, explaining that differing state regulations in the area were foreclosed by the national policy of uniform
standards and regulations embodied in the PWSA. The instant
court rejected the defendant's argument that pre-emption should
be avoided because a non-complying tanker would have the option
of choosing a tug escort, 0 stating that Congress gave the Coast
Guard authority to require a tug escort. The court also rejected
defendant's argument that since the state's Tanker Law is part of
a comprehensive coastal management plan, and since Congress
encouraged the states to design these plans in forming environmental regulations, the law should be upheld. Instead, the court
found that such "cooperative federalism" has only been invoked
in its water-related regulatory programs, 7' where Congress explicitly invited state participation,"2 and that since the PWSA did not
invite such state participation, it did not share regulatory authority with the states over oil tankers. 73 The court considered in detail
defendant's proffered case authority, finding that in Askew v.
American Waterways Operations, Inc. ,7 the state regulatory
scheme did not conflict with federal tanker regulations since
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
70. See WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.170 (Supp. 1976).
71. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. and
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857.
72. Id.
73. Consequently, the court invalidated WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.180 (Supp.
1976), which required the presence of a state licensed pilot on all tankers larger
than 50,000 deadweight tons, because it found that statute conflicted with 46
U.S.C. § 215 (1952), which declares that "[n]o State or municipal government
shall impose upon pilots of steam vessels any obligation to procure a State or
other license in addition to that issued by the United States, or any other regulation which will impede such pilots in the performance of the duties required by
Title 56 . ...
74. 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upheld Florida statute imposing strict liability on oil
spillers).
67.
68.
69.
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Askew involved the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970, ', not the PWSA, and since the Supreme Court's holding in
that case reflected in part the congressional policy of "cooperative
federalism" in the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act. The
instant court also distinguished the case of Huron Portland Ce8 by explaining that the environmental
ment v. City of Detroit"
purpose of Detroit's ordinance was not pre-empted by federal
safety regulations since there was "no overlap between the scope
of the federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance."" Since the PWSA introduced environmental considerations into the federal tanker regulations,7 the instant court found
that the State of Washington could not maintain that there was
"no overlap" between the state and the federal laws. Finally, the
court decided that the Secretary of Commerce's approval of Washington's coastal management plan did not preclude federal preemption of the area. The court noted that although the Secretary
of Commerce can approve a state's coastal management plan only
if the "views of the Federal agencies principally affected by such
program have been adequately considered,

79

the Secretary may or

may not have "considered" the views of the Coast Guard or noticed
the pre-emption effect of the PWSA on Washington's Tanker Law.
Thus, the court decided that the Secretary's approval of the
coastal management plan to which the Tanker Law was only collaterally related would not foreclose an inquiry into whether there
had been federal pre-emption of oil tanker regulations. Therefore,
the court held that since the Washington Tanker Law conflicted
with federal law which intended to pre-empt state regulation in the
area, state officers could be enjoined from enforcing that state law.
Although the instant court did not discuss its decision on abstention," it appears to have correctly decided that jurisdictional issue.
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
76. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
77. 362 U.S. at 446.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. V 1975) (stating that its purpose is "to protect
the navigable waters and resources therein from environmental harm resulting
from vessel or structure damage.")
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (1970). See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans, No. C 75648 at 6. U.S. ,S.CT. (19-).
80. The opinion of the instant court only touched upon the abstention question stating that ". . . the state invites us to 'overrule' Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), or at least to restrict the scope of the cases falling within the Young
'exception' to the Eleventh Amendment. The invitation is attractively and persuasively argued, but we decline it. The Supreme Court, if it chooses to do so,
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The Pullman doctrine requires that for a federal court to abstain,
the relevant state law must be unclear and must be subject to an
interpretation that would avoid ruling on a constitutional question. In the instant case the court appropriately decided not to
abstain since the state Tanker Law was clear on its face, the state
issue was not overly sensitive, and the issue demanded swift adjudication. On the other hand, the court discussed extensively the
issue of pre-emption. Although in dealing with the issue of preemption a court should base its holding on an assessment of the
functional and practical issues raised by the facts of the particular
case,' the instant court disposed of the issue by referring to formal
and conceptual statements of law. In doing so, the court gave no
indication that it had considered such practical factors as the effect of the state ordinance on the flow of commerce, the effectiveness of the ordinance in eliminating the evil to be controlled, or the
character of the business being regulated. Moreover the factors
most frequently cited by the Supreme Court in recent pre-emption
cases were conspicuously absent from the instant court's opinion.
These four important factors are: (1) the existence or non-existence
of conflicting state regulations on the same subject, 2 (2) the effect
of the regulation on the free flow of commerce,83 (3) the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving the goal that the state is attempting to attain through the use of its police power,8" and (4) the
nature and extent of the interest that the state is trying to protect.
In the instant case, it is questionable whether the first factor
should be applied in deciding the constitutionality of this regulation. If the mere existence of a conflict among the laws of different
states is a sufficient ground for invalidating the statute, healthy
will have ample opportunity to reconsider Young." No. 75-648, slip op. at 2 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
81. It has been the practice of the Supreme Court, in pre-emption cases analogous to the instant case, to rest its decision on the basis of such factors. The Court
has pursued an increasingly interventionist role, assuming an almost quasilegislative stance, by inquiring into the effectiveness and wisdom of the legislature. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In many
instances, however, although the Court has inquired into the functional aspect
of such state laws, it has not pursued this line of thinking in its written opinions.
82. For a discussion of this problem, see The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74
HAlv. L. REv. 132 (1960).
83. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
84. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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innovatidn would be stifled and the latter of two conflicting state
statutes would necessarily be invalidated. Furthermore, a court
might interpret "conflicting state regulations" to mean
''conflicting state policies." The regulations of a given state might
then be found to conflict when that state promulgated regulations
in an area another state chose to leave unregulated. Acceptance of
this view could require invalidating the state regulation in the
instant case since the record would show conflicting state regulations, although no other state was shown to have a regulation dealing with the entry of supertankers into their harbors. With respect
to the second practical factor, the Supreme Court would be less
likely to invalidate the instant regulation if it merely increases the
cost of engaging in interstate commerce, 5 rather than if it actually
restricts the physical flow of goods from one state to another. 6
Compliance with the tanker regulation in the instant case would
not restrict the free flow of goods across state lines but would surely
increase the cost of shipping oil.87 Third, if it appears that the
regulation does not achieve its goal, the Supreme Court would be
more likely to invalidate the law.88 The Court, however, would have
a difficult time disproving the utility of the oil tanker regulation. 9
In approaching the fourth practical factor, the Supreme Court
would be more inclined to uphold a state statute if it appears that
the state is regulating some legitimate local interest." In the in85. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938);
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
86. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526 (1959); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
87, Compliance with the standards would require additional investments in
costly equipment, the re-routing of supertankers to more distant ports, or the
delay and cost of utilizing the tug escort.
88. The Court noted in Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526
(1959) that cost, taken into consideration with other factors, might be relevant
in some cases to the issue of the burden on commerce. For instance, in striking
down a maximum train length regulation in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
supra note 81, the Court itself determined that the regulation would not increase
safety by reducing train accidents and employee injuries.
89. See Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
Justice Douglas' majority opinion noted that there have been over 3000 oil spills
within U.S. waters annually and that the number increases yearly because of the
increased importation of foreign oil. In addition, the rash of oil spills in 1977,
highlighted by the grounding of the Argo Merchant off the Massachusetts coast,
has prompted President Carter to call for more legislation, much of which is
similar to the Washington Tanker Law.
90. A state's proprietary interest in the maintenance of its highways weighs
heavily in favor of laws regulating the use of those highways. South Carolina
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stant case, it should be clear to the Supreme Court that Washington has a legitimate local interest in protecting its environment,
wildlife, fishing industry, and its inhabitants and their property
from oil spill contamination. The instant court also failed to consider other functional factors such as the extra-territorial effect of
the state regulation, the economic effect on the industry involved,
and the likelihood of future congressional action in the disputed
area.' Nevertheless, the most important factor to be considered in
a state regulation requiring the use of certain equipment is the
regulation's effect on the use of equipment in interstate commerce.
Where the prescribed type of equipment'is specified in a contract
or agreement, a carrier engaged in interstate commerce may be
forced to stop and change equipment if two states have differing
requirements.9 2 The Washington requirements can be avoided,
however, if the carrier arranges a tug boat escort for its tanker. It
appears, therefore, that the instant court decided the pre-emption
issue incorrectly since it not only failed to consider the practical
and functional factors involved, but also failed to provide persuasive arguments in finding any specific legislative pre-emption
of the state regulation.9 " The ultimate effect of the instant holding is that although the states may participate with the federal
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
91. For a discussion of this problem see, Wall St.J., March 21, 1977, at 8,
col. 1. The article notes that the new administration under President Carter is
calling for a number of legislative and regulatory steps to crack down on accidental and intentional discharges of oil by ocean-going vessels. These steps involve
plans for tougher Coast Guard rules for tankers entering U.S. ports, a request that
the Senate ratify a previously shelved international agreement under which
tanker requirements are admittedly less stringent than the envisioned United
States rules, and backing for an already proposed $200 million fund to compensate persons or towns suffering damage from oil spills.
92. In Bibb v. Navajo FreightLines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), the challenged
regulation would have necessitated changing mudguards at the state line, since
Illinois and Arkansas both required a different type of mudguard. Thus the Illinois regulation was invalidated.
93. The minimum design specifications required by § 3(2) of the Tanker Law
were not pre-empted because they can be avoided if a tanker has a tugboat escort.
The instant court's argument that the tugboat escort provision was also preempted because Congress gave the Coast Guard authority to require such escorts
is incorrect. The congressional grant of authority to the Coast Guard to require
such escorts does not mean that the authority is exclusive. States have been
allowed to legislate in many areas covered by federal law as long as those regulations do not conflict with federal law. The state's power to require tug escorts does
not directly conflict with any federal laws on the subject but merely modifies the
conditions under which such escorts would be used.
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government in the establishment of certain environmental controls, such an emission (air) and discharge (water) standards,94
they will not be able to regulate in the area of marine safety
equipment in an attempt to prevent environmental harm resulting
from large oil spills. The instant court rationalizes this result on
the basis of federal pre-emption. The underlying reason for the
court's decision, however, appears to be that such a law would
increase the cost and burden on the interstate and international
transportation of oil at a time when the public is more willing to
sacrifice the environment in order to deal with the energy crisis. 5
Regardless of the future disposition of this case, analysis of the preemption issue would benefit measurably from the more systematic
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the most recent preemption cases. The instant decision's subjective approach points
up the hazards of allowing different federal courts to inject their
own policy considerations into their interpretations of existing
federal laws and the relevant state regulations.
ChristopherRyan
94. As the court noted in the instant case, "cooperative federalism" has been
the congressional policy for designing the United States environmental policy.
Congress funded and encouraged the coastal states to design comprehensive and
forward looking coastal management plans. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976). Congress has
invoked "cooperative federalism" or at least some state involvement in virtually
all of its water-related regulatory programs. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Estuarine Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-26 (1970).
95. See The Price of Environmentalism-TheBacklash Begins, FORBES, June
1977, at 36.

SECURITIES REGULATION-Ju RISDICTION-ALLEGATIONS
THAT AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES TRANSACTION INVOLVING STOCK
REGISTERED ON AN AMERICAN EXCHANGE ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE
AMERICAN MARKET ARE SUFFICIENT TO INVOKE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION IN SECTION 10(b) ACTIONS
Plaintiffs, a Canadian national' and former Canadian Plywood Corporation, Ltd. shareholder, and the Western Pacific
Trust Company of Canada, a Canadian corporation and trustee for
former Canadian Plywood shareholders, sought to secure equitable
relief and recover damages arising out of an allegedly fraudulent
stock transaction in violation of section 10(b) 2 between the Gold-

field Corporation and Canadian Plywood. Goldfield, a Delaware
corporation, entered into a contract in 1969 to purchase the
stock and assets of Canadian Plywood, a Canadian corporation.'
The three-step acquisition plan provided that Canadian Plywood
would form the Canadian Plywood Holding Corporation (CPHC),
a Canadian corporation,4 to acquire outstanding Canadian Ply1.

Richard S. Des Brisay brought this derivative action both individually and

on behalf of all former Canadian Plywood shareholders. One member of the purported class, Sigvard Dahl, is allegedly an American citizen; the remaining 307

are Canadians.
2. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1970),
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Plaintiffs allege that Dahl, a Washington resident, received a fraudulent "TakeOver Bid Circular" through the United States mails. The Circular stated that
"The contents of this Take-Over Bid Circular have been approved and delivery
thereof has been authorized by the executive committee of the Board of Directors
of Goldfield and Goldfield Lumber."
3. Canadian Plywood was incorporated in 1968 in British Columbia, Canada,
as a public company. Of the 400 shares of Canadian Plywood stock issued, 308
were held by Canadian Plywood employees or former employees. The remaining
92 shares were issued to three British Columbia "shell corporations" which had
been formed for the purpose of assuming Canadian Plywood's debts, which included wage claims, taxes, and trade obligations. Brief for Appellee at 4, 6, Des
Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
4. CPHC was incorporated on September 26, 1969, in British Columbia, Canada. Most of its directors were also directors of Canadian Plywood. Id. at 5.
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wood shares in exchange for its own shares.5 Goldfield in turn
would place sufficient shares of Goldfield or Goldfield Lumber
Enterprises Limited (GLEL) stock6 to make up the purchase price
in CPHC, accompanied by an opinion by Goldfield's New York
counsel that Goldfield stock could be validly traded on the American Stock Exchange. CPHC would then transfer the Canadian
Plywood shares and assets to Goldfield. Finally, CPHC would exchange the Goldfield stock for its own stock as part of its liquidation, and then dissolve.7 Goldfield further agreed to deliver additional Goldfield shares to the extent necessary to make up the
difference between the price at closing and the price obtained
where such shares were sold on the American Stock Exchange
within sixty days of the closing date, where the closing price was
higher than the traded price.8 The Securities and Exchange Commission, upon learning of the proposed transaction, instituted proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and secured an order9 enjoining further sale of
Goldfield securities." All trading in Goldfield stock on the American Stock Exchange was subsequently suspended. 1 The district
5. On September 21, 1969, Canadian Plywood shareholders held an extraordinary general meeting and passed a resolution establishing the terms under which
their shares would be exchanged for those of CPHC. Id. at 5.
6. GLEL, a British Columbia corporation, is named as a defendant in the case
and is allegedly a wholly-owned subsidiary of Goldfield. The court's opinion
makes no mention of GLEL, and appellee's brief contends that GLEL was not
served with process, did not participate in the district court proceedings, and is
not a party in the instant appeal.
7. The agreement provided that CPHC would deliver the Goldfield shares to
Western Pacific Trust Company of Canada, which would act as trustee for the
individual shareholders.
8. This provision was intended to protect the former Canadian Plywood shareholders from temporary fluctuations in the price of Goldfield stock following the
transaction.
9. [1969-70 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (C.C.H.) 92,636 (S.D.N.Y.
April 10, 1970).
10. Appellee's brief alleges that the Goldfield shares involved in this transaction had not been registered with the S.E.C.; accordingly, the order entered on
April 10, 1970, only sought to enjoin the further sale of unregistered Goldfield
stock pursuant to §§ 5 and 20 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e &
77t (1970).
11. Of the 489,193 Goldfield shares originally held in trust by Western Pacific,
some had been distributed to those former Canadian Plywood shareholders who
had so elected, and approximately $1,376,750 worth of the other shares had been
sold prior to the suspension of trading in Goldfield stock. As a result, Western
Pacific still retained approximately 144,000 Goldfield shares which could not be
traded or transferred.
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court sustained Goldfield's Rule 12(b) motion for summary judg-

ment as plaintiffs failed to establish the court's subject matter
jurisdiction.'" On appeal to the United States Court of Appeais for
the Ninth Circuit, held, reversed. Allegations that a transaction
involved an improper use of securities of a United States corporation, that such securities were registered and listed on a national
stock exchange, and that the transaction adversely affected both
the plaintiff and the United States market in that corporation's
securities are sufficient to invoke the federal district court's subject
matter jurisdiction over enforcement actions brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977).
The Securities Act of 1933' 3 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934' 4 were enacted to protect private individuals investing in the
domestic securities market and "to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets in such transactions."'" Recently, the federal
courts have struggled to determine the extent to which United
States securities laws should apply extraterritorially to international securities transactions." While section 30(b) of the 1934
12.

Section 22 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970) provides:

(a) The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts
of any Territory, shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this
subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial
courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any
liability or duty created by this subchapter ....
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970),
provides a similar grant of jurisdiction to the federal district courts over alleged
violations of United States securities laws. In its unpublished memorandum opinion and order entered April 23, 1975, however, the district court held that it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction as United States securities laws do not apply
to an essentially foreign transaction where there is no significant impact on
United States markets or investors, or where Goldfield did not engage in substantial conduct in the United States in perpetrating the alleged fraud.
13. Ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
14. Ch.404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970 & Supp. V
1975)).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78b. See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
16. One commentator defines an international securities transaction as one
"involving a buyer and seller of different nationalities in which more than de
minimis contacts between them take place outside the territory of the state whose
jurisdiction is invoked over the transaction." Comment, From Schoenbaum to
Scherk: The Continuing Question of Subject Matter Jurisdictionin an International Securities Transaction, 12 Hous. L. REv. 924 (1975).

332

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[Vol 10: 329

Act'" does exclude any person who "transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States" from the Act's
provisions,' 8 there is unfortunately no language in the 1934 Act
governing the extraterritorial applicability of section 10(b) to international transactions. In the absence of specific congressional
intent, then, the courts have applied principles of international
law in defining the scope of United States jurisdiction over international securities transactions disputes. 9 The principle of objective
territoriality has been applied where conduct occurring outside a
state's territory has a significant effect within that territory." The
principle of subjective territoriality has been applied where significant conduct occurs within a state's territory.2 ' In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,22 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied the principle of objective territoriality to find subject matter jurisdiction
under United States securities laws over a stock transaction conducted by a Canadian corporation, where the securities involved
were listed on a domestic exchange and the activities alleged had
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970).
18. In order for the section 30(b) exclusion to apply, the courts have apparently held that three conditions must be met. First, no substantial conduct must
have occurred in the United States. Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). Second, an actual "business in securities" must be involved
rather than merely an isolated sale of securities. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on the merits, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Third, no
legitimate American interests must be at stake, whether the conduct occurs
within or without United States territorial limits. SEC v. United Financial
Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). See 28 VAND. L. REv. 1382, 1384 (1976).
19. Generally, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing
conduct and persons within its territory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a) (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]. In addition to territorial jurisdiction, there are five other bases
of jurisdiction available to states: 1) objective territorial jurisdiction (a state may
regulate conduct occurring outside its territory and producing an effect within its
territory); 2) nationality jurisdiction (a state has jurisdiction over its citizens'
conduct, even where such conduct occurs outside the state's boundaries); 3) passive personality jurisdiction (a state has jurisdiction over conduct which injures
one of its citizens); 4) protective jurisdiction (a state has jurisdiction to prescribe
legal rules governing conduct that threatens its national security or governmental
operations); and 5) universal jurisdiction (a state having custody of a person
committing an act has jurisdiction over that act-e.g., piracy). Draft Convention
on Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 445 (Supp. 1935).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
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an adverse effect upon the United States securities market. 23 The
24 took the
court in Finch v. Marathon Securities Corporation
Schoenbaum holding one step further and held that where neither
objective nor subjective territorial jurisdiction exists, no subject
matter jurisdiction under United States securities laws exists. Two
years later, in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell,5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals apparently limited
its ruling in Schoenbaum and held that adverse market effects
alone are insufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction.2 6 The
court applied the theory of subjective territoriality in requiring a
combination of adverse effects and significant conduct within the
United States" before applying United States securities laws to an
international securities transaction. The court further suggested
that subject matter jurisdiction might not exist where United
States interests are not substantially involved. 28 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consequently adopted the Leasco standard
and held that extensive use of the United States mails and other
facilities of interstate commerce, such as the telephone, constituted the minimum amount of activity within the United States
needed to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. 2 In SEC v. United
Financial Group,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
hold that significant conduct within the United States was in itself
23. 405 F.2d at 206. In this shareholder derivative suit brought by an American shareholder of a Canadian corporation, the court stated that:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased
foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American
securities.
24. 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. 468 F.2d at 1333.
27. Acts constituting conduct within the United States consisted of transatlantic telephone calls and letters referring to the transaction between the American and British corporations, face-to-face conversations in the United States
between representatives of the two corporations, and the signing of the agreement
in New York for the future purchase of stock. Id. at 1332.
28. Id. at 1338. The court's hypothetical involved a German and a Japanese
businessman meeting in New York merely for convenience, where the Japanese
visitor fraudulently induced the German investor to purchase Japanese securities
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
29. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). Note that
both Leasco and Travis involved resident American investors holding stock in
Canadian corporations.
30. 474 F.2d 354.
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sufficient grounds to justify application of United States securities
laws, although the court did note that the SEC's contention that
jurisdiction existed solely on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentations made through the mails by a United States corporation to
a foreign corporation was "not without merit. '31 On the other
hand, the court stated that the relative number of United States
shareholders involved is not determinative of jurisdiction. 2 While
that factor is to be considered, courts should focus upon a defendant's activities within the United States and the impact of such
activities upon United States investors. 3 Applying these twin requirements of substantial conduct within the United States and a
resultant significant effect upon United States securities markets,
the court in Selas of America (Nederland) v. Selas Corporationof
America34 exercised jurisdiction in an action brought by a foreign
plaintiff, a Dutch corporation and former subsidiary of the defendant United States corporation. The court reasoned that the defendant's stock was traded in the United States, that the agreement
to sell was reached in the United States, and that the transaction
had a significant effect on a United States stock exchange. At this
point, the courts' slow development of a test for the extraterritorial
application of United States securities laws took a strange twist in
the Supreme Court's determination of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co.3" Despite the presence of sufficient facts" under the Leasco
31. 474 F.2d at 354. In this case, the SEC sought an injunction against a
Delaware holding company which controlled a large complex of mutual funds
incorporated in various foreign countries. The court found that jurisdiction existed since the complex of foreign companies was directed and controlled from the
United States, Americans held shares in some of the funds, and defendant used
the United States mails and other interstate commerce facilities.
32. Id. at 356. See Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (American citizenship of parties who controlled an off-shore
mutual fund considered to be significant but not sufficient for subject matter

jurisdiction).
33. 474 F.2d at 356-57.
34. 365 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
35. 365 F. Supp. at 1386.
36. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). For a discussion of the case, see 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 901 (1975).
37. The facts indicated that there was an omission of a material fact by
defendant during crucial negotiations in the United States, that plaintiff corpora-

tion's stock was listed on the New York exchange, that negotiations took place in
the United States as well as in England and Germany, and that the trademarks,

the disputed elements of the transaction, were licensed both in the United States
and in Europe. 417 U.S. at 515-29.
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standard to invoke subject matter jurisdiction, the Court held that
the arbitration clauseM in the parties' contract was enforceable and
effectively circumvented the extraterritorial scope of the securities
laws.3" One year later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals returned to the main line of cases and issued two opinions further
restricting the scope of the Schoenbaum "adverse effects" test.40 In
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,4" the court held that, in actions
brought by domestic United States investors, the significant domestic effect requirement would be met only where the effect of
extraterritorial conduct was "a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct.

42

In IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,4 3 decided on the same day,

plaintiff's argument that the mere existence of United States
investors indicated that defendant's activities had a significant
effect in the United States was rejected by the court.44 Instead,
jurisdiction was predicated upon the defendant's fraudulent acts
within the United States, where such acts constituted per se violations of the securities laws.45 The most recent case determining the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
Inc.,4" involved a West German plaintiff in an action for securities
fraud brought against a registered securities broker-dealer in New
38. The arbitration clause provided, in pertinent part, that "any controversy
or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof ... shall
be settled exclusively by arbitration in accordance with the rules . . .of the
International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France ....
" 417 U.S. at 508-09

n.1.
39. Id. at 517-18.
40. See Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud, 89
HARv. L. REv. 553 (1976).

41.

519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. deniedsub nom. Berschv. Arthur Ander-

sen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
42. 519 F.2d at 1000. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 18(b). The court
noted that three classes of purchasers were involved in this transaction: (1) resident United States investors; (2) United States residents abroad; and (3) foreigners purchasing outside the United States. Subject matter jurisdiction existed over
the first class because of adverse effects on the investors; jurisdiction existed over
the second class where preparatory acts in the United States necessarily involved
United States interests; and jurisdiction existed over the third class if and only
if direct acts in the United States caused the fraud (mere preparatory acts are
insufficient). 519 F.2d at 984-93.
43. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. Only 0.2% of ]IT's fundholders were Americans, and they controlled no
more than 0.5% of the fund's total shares. Also, HIT had not intended to offer its
shares to United States citizens. 519 F.2d at 1016-17.
45. Id. at 1017-18.
46. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Jersey. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited IT and expressly held that foreign nationals may invoke the protection of the
federal securities laws where defendant's fraudulent scheme was
conceived in the United States by an American citizen, where the
scheme involved stock in a United States corporation traded on an
American exchange, and where a United States securities broker
was responsible for the wrongful omissions." Stating that defendant's conduct within the United States was sufficient to invoke
its territorial jurisdiction,48 the court ignored the principle of objective territoriality applied originally in Schoenbaum.
In the instant case, the court first noted that it was required to
take the plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of reviewing the
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court found itself unable to consider the affidavits and exhibits offered by defendants showing
that this transaction had already resulted in considerable litigation in Canadian courts, ° especially since the district court's opinion had not considered such evidence in granting defendant's motion'for summary judgment.5 The court further emphasized the
provisional nature of its holding that subject matter jurisdiction
existed, stating that the district court should properly dismiss the
action on remand if the plaintiffs failed to establish the facts necessary for jurisdiction. The court found that the precise issue on
appeal was whether the district court had erred in finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish prima facie the existence of sufficient jurisdictional facts to maintain an action under 15 U.S.C. §§
77v and 78aa.52 Noting that congressional intent in enacting the
47. 540 F.2d at 595. The court also noted that the United States had a strong
policy interest in regulating the conduct of its broker-dealers and in increasing
world confidence in its securities markets. Id.
48. Id.
49. 549 F.2d at 135 n.3 citing Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 284
(1972).
50. Apparently, Canadian courts had supervised the settlement of disputes
arising between Goldfield and CPHC in 1970-71. The formal settlement was approved by CPHC shareholders at a shareholders meeting and by the Supreme
Court of British Columbia. Various CPHC shareholders had unsuccessfully challenged the settlement in British Columbia courts. Additionally, the Canadian
courts had heard other disputes arising out of Western Pacific's handling and
distribution of the Goldfield shares. See Brief for Appellee at 8-9, 549 F.2d 133.
The instant case was the first action instituted in a United States court arising
out of the Goldfield-Canadian Plywood transaction.
51. 549 F.2d at 135 n.3.
52. These are the jurisdictional statutes of the Securities Acts. See note 12

supra.
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Securities Acts was "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets, 5' 3 the court cited Schoenbaum in finding that this objec-

tive would be best served by extending the jurisdictional scope of
the Acts to include fraudulent extraterritorial transactions involving securities registered on American exchanges, where such transactions had an effect on domestic securities markets. Using the
precedent established in Roth v.Fund of Funds, Inc.,5" the court
then found that relief could be granted under the Securities Acts
where foreign corporations improperly dealt in United States securities, since the effect of such conduct on the domestic securities
market does not depend upon the nationality of the trader.5
Applying the "significant effects" test to the instant case, the court
concluded that both the plaintiffs and the United States market
in Goldfield securities were adversely affected by the takeover
transaction where a court order issued enjoining further trading in
Goldfield stock. The court factually distinguished the instant case
from Bersch v. Drexel Firestone,Inc., finding that Bersch involved
trading in the securities of a foreign corporation, where such securities were not listed on an American exchange and where the transaction did not result in direct financial injury to holders of the
securities. 6 The court accordingly held that plaintiffs' allegations,
contending that the instant transaction involved the securities of
a United States corporation which were listed on a national stock
exchange and adversely affected domestic markets, were prima
facie sufficient to invoke the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Securities Acts.
The instant court's application of the Schoenbaum "significant
effects" test has completed the circular development of the extraterritorial scope and application of United States securities laws.
The courts have applied a three-step test in determining the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction over international securities transactions. The court would first decide whether jurisdiction
existed under the Straub doctrine of territorial jurisdiction, that
is, if the defendant engaged in sufficient conduct within the United
States so as to make the United States the locus of the transaction.
If jurisdiction could not be based on territoriality, the court would
then determine whether defendant's conduct constituted a per se
violation of United States securities laws sufficient to invoke juris53.
54.
55.
56.

15 U.S.C. § 78b.
405 F.2d 421.
549 F.2d at 135.
549 F.2d at 136 n.4.
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diction under the Securities Acts under the IT doctrine. Third, in
cases such as Bersch where no domestic conduct was involved, the
court would consider whether objective territorial jurisdiction
could be found where extraterritorial conduct resulted in an adverse effect on domestic commerce which was a direct and foreseeable result of that conduct." In any case, allegations that a defendant's extraterritorial conduct resulted in adverse effects in the
United States would not be as persuasive as allegations that a
defendant's conduct within the United States resulted in fraud. In
the instant case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
Schoenbaum "significant effects" test, which repudiates the threestep test previously applied by the courts. This decision has reversed a ten year development in judicial construction of the Securities Acts' extraterritorial applicability. Thus, the instant opinion raises the question of whether courts should apply a
"significant effects" test, a "substantial conduct" test, or a combination of both in determining the extraterritorial application of
United States securities laws. Arguably, the "significant effects"
test would be most consistent with the Acts' original purpose-namely, the protection of domestic securities markets and
investors. While the "substantial conduct" test was originally a
substantive test used to determine jurisdiction over disputed securities transactions, the courts have distorted its purpose to such
an extent that it has become merely a procedural method of establishing personal jurisdiction and ensuring service of process upon
defendant corporations. The courts have thus extended their jurisdiction under the securities laws to the point where transactions
intended to have no effect in the United States can be subjected
to United States regulation. Such a result cannot be inferred from
the statutory language. On the other hand, adoption of the
"substantial conduct" test enables the United States to broaden
the scope of its jurisdiction to include foreigners whose conduct
adversely affects United States markets. 8 In their decision to exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial securities transactions, however, the courts have overlooked or ignored the nationality of foreign plaintiffs, assuming that such injured parties have standing
to sue where the defendants violated United States securities
laws. 9 Where the defendant is a United States corporation subject
57. See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
58. For a discussion of the problems of enforcing judgments rendered in international securities litigation, see 12 Hous. L. REv., supra note 16, at 938.
59. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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to the jurisdiction of United States laws, a suit by a foreign plaintiff would seem to be fair and equitable from a policy standpoint.
It should be noted, however, that other nation states can also exercise jurisdiction over transnational securities disputes by invoking
principles of international law. 0 Thus, where a transaction is
structured to satisfy Canadian laws, and adequate Canadian judicial remedies are available to a Canadian plaintiff, United States
courts should be reluctant to accept jurisdiction over and apply
United States laws to such a transaction. Injured American investors, however, should have the opportunity to bring suit in American courts under the securities laws. In view of the rapid proliferation of multinational corporations and the resulting international
flow of capital, nations will need to coordinate their securities legislation in order to determine areas of questionable jurisdiction.
Due to the equally important need for a clear judicial standard to
apply in determining jurisdiction questions, Congress should offer
the courts some needed guidance by remedying the legislative
ambiguity concerning extraterritorial application of the Securities
6
Acts. '
Phyllis K. Fong
60. See note 19 supra.
61. Until Congress deals with this issue, practitioners would do well to
advise clients engaged in international securities transactions to include an arbitration clause in the contract which stipulates the applicable law. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Cf. text at notes 36-39 supra.

TAXATION

-

INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT -

PROVISIONS OF CLOSING

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SUBSIDIZED SHIP OPERATORS AND THE INTER-

NAL REVENUE SERVICE WHICH DEAL WITH RESERVE FUNDS CONSTITUTE
SPECIAL DEPRECIATION ARRANGEMENTS

Taxpayer, Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.,' brought an action for a
tax refund based on the difference between the investment tax
credit taxpayer had claimed and the investment tax credit the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had allowed. 2 The Revenue Act of
19621 provided for an investment tax credit for qualified investments,' which included "any vessel documented under the laws of
the United States which is operated in the foreign or domestic
commerce of the United States."' Taxpayer purchased two new
vessels in 1962 and, basing its computations on the total amount
it had invested in the purchase,' claimed an investment tax credit.
The IRS disallowed from taxpayer's computations the inclusion of
monies expended from tax-deferred funds held by taxpayer' and
reduced taxpayer's tax credit accordingly, issuing a deficiency notice for taxes due? The IRS contended that a tax credit based on
investments made with tax-deferred funds would permit taxpayer
a double deduction. 0 The Court of Claims, however, granted taxpayer's motion for summary judgment and, held: For the purposes
of the investment tax credit, tax-deferred funds invested in new
vessels were properly included in taxpayer's basis in the vessels.
Pacific Far East Lines, Inc. v. United States, 544 F.2d 478 (Ct.Cl.
1976).
Section 607 of the Merchant Marine Act of 19361 required each
1. Taxpayer is a contractor, subsidized under the provisions of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Taxpayer claimed an investment tax credit pursuant to the Revenue Act
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 962 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 38, 4648 (1977).
3. Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).

4. Id. § 2. The amount of the credit was seven percent of qualified investment.
5. I.R.C. § 46(c).
6. I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(B)(iii).
7.

"Plaintiff paid $14,558,925 for the ships." Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc. v.

United States, 544 F.2d 478, 482 (Ct.C. 1976).
8. These were taxpayer's "capital reserve fund" and "special reserve fund,"
discussed in text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
9. 544 F.2d at 482.
10. See note 23 infra.
11. Ch. 858, § 607, 49 Stat. 2005 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)).
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vessel operator with a subsidy contract under the Act" to establish
a "capital reserve fund"'' 3 and a "special reserve fund"' 4 in order
"[tlo insure the prompt payment of the contractor's obligations
to the United States and the replacement of the contractor's subsidized vessels."'" The Act defined the "capital reserve fund"'" as a
deposit composed of amounts equal to (1) the annual depreciation
expenses of subsidized vessels, (2) all proceeds from the sale or
disposition of subsidized ships, (3) any insurance benefits and indemnities on such ships, (4) one half of all profits in excess of ten
percent per annum, (5) such further amounts as the Maritime
Administration might deem necessary, and (6) such additional
amounts as the contractor, with the approval of the Maritime
Administration, might desire. 7 The statute permitted subsidized
operators to use the fund to reconstruct old or to purchase new
ships and to "pay the principal, when due, on all notes secured by
mortgage on the subsidized vessels.'

8

The "special reserve fund,"

profits,' 9

comprised of certain excess
served as a source of reimbursement for operating losses and for any portion of subsidies
"recaptured" by the Maritime Administration under other provisions of the subsidy agreement. ° Both funds" received deferential
12. The operating-differential subsidy was instituted in order to equalize the
cost of operating United States flag vessels with the cost of operating foreign flag
vessels, since the latter benefit from lower labor and construction costs. The
subsidy's raison d'etre is, in part, based on the theory that a strong merchant
marine is necessary for national defense. See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 413 F.2d 568, 570-71 (Ct.Cl. 1969) (describing the history and
purpose of the operating-differential subsidy).
13. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 607(b), 49 Stat. 2005 (current
version at 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
14. Id. § 607(c).
15. Id. § 607(b).
16. Descriptions of the composition and use of capital and special reserve
funds and other provisions of the Merchant Marine Act are derived from the
provisions of the Act, as amended, which were in force in 1962.
17. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 607(b), 49 Stat. 2005 (current
version at 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
18. Id.
19, "If the profits, without regard to capital gains and capital losses, earned
by the business of the subsidized vessels and services incident thereto exceed 10
per centum per annum and exceed the percentage of profits deposited in the
capital reserve fund. . . the contractor shall deposit annually such excess profits
in this reserve fund." Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 600, § 25, 52 Stat. 960.
20. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, ch. 858, § 606(5), 49 Stat. 2005 (current
version at 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), as amended by Act of May
10, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-515, 70 Stat. 148, provided:
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tax treatment, since the Act provided that "earnings

. .

. depos-

ited in the contractor's reserve funds. . shall be exempt from all
Federal taxes." 2 However, since treatment of the funds as taxexempt would allow vessel owners a double deduction,2 the IRS
determined that these funds would be treated as "tax-deferred"
rather than as tax-exempt, and in 1947 all then-subsidized operators entered "closing agreements" with the IRS24 to that effect.2
"Tax-deferred" meant that ordinary income and capital gains deposited into reserve funds would not be recognized as taxable income when received, but that contractors could not include any
fund monies invested in ships in their tax bases in such vessels. 6
Despite the financial advantages the tax-deferred treatment afforded subsidized contractors,2 however, Congress enacted no spe...that when at the end of any ten-year period during which an operatingdifferential subsidy has been paid under a contract. . . if the net profit of
the contractor. . . during such period. . . has averaged more than 10 per
centum per annum upon the contractor's capital investment necessarily
employed in the operation . . ., the contractor shall pay to the United
States an amount equal to one-half of such profits in excess of 10 per
centum per annum as partial or complete reimbursement for operatingdifferential subsidy payments received by the contractor for such recapture
period ...
See also Sarisky, Sea and Air Subsidies: A Comparative Study, 36 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 59, 81-85 (1967) (subsidy reduction programs).
21. Both funds will be collectively referred to as "reserve funds."
22. Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 600, § 28, 52 Stat. 961.
23. Ordinary income and capital gains deposited into reserve funds were not
included in taxable income. If the funds were to be treated as tax-exempt, vessels
purchased with monies from the funds could be depreciated, thereby providing a
second reduction in taxable income due to the same ordinary income and capital
gains. See 544 F.2d at 491 (Cowan, C.J., dissenting). The question became moot
as to funds deposited after December 31, 1969, by operation of an amendment to
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, providing for essentially the same tax treatment of reserve funds as provided by the 1947 closing agreements. Act of Oct. 21,
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-469, § 21(a), 84 Stat. 1026 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1177 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
24. 544 F.2d at 480. The agreements also stated that if a court were to hold
the statutes to mean tax-exempt, the funds would be so treated beginning in the
year of the court's decision. Id.
25. Taxpayer in the instant case was not a party to the 1947 closing agreements, but entered an essentially identical agreement in 1954 as a prerequisite
to receiving a subsidy under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Id. at 481.
26. Id.
27. The subsidy itself provides a financial advantage since it enables ship
operators to construct and operate vessels at a lower cost. See generally Morse,
A Review of the Assistance Provided to the American Merchant Marine Under
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cial provisions to limit the application of the 1962 investment tax
credit with regard to vessel operators. Attempts by the IRS to
minimize the benefits derived by subsidized contractors from the
tax credit were unsuccessful. In Lykes Brothers Steamship Co.,
Inc. v. United States,"' the Court of Claims held that the credit
could not be reduced because ships were constructed using operators' plans and specifications. The court also proscribed a diminution of the credit where ships were substantially completed prior
to the passage of the Revenue Act of 19629 and held that the credit
could not be used to reduce the amount of subsidy received." In
each of these cases the Court of Claims based its decision, in part,
on the purpose for which the tax credit was enacted: to increase
"the profitability of productive investment by reducing the net
cost of acquiring new equipment."'3' In States Steamship Co. v.
United States,3" the court indicated that subsidy agreements were
not to be construed in a manner which would thwart the economic
effectiveness of the investment tax credit, and held that parties to
subsidy agreements were not to be bound to "future changes in the
tax laws, no matter how far reaching or important. 3 3 [Emphasis
by the court.] Thus, prior to the instant case the courts had established that subsidized ship operators were to be accorded the full
benefit of the investment tax credit.
In the instant case, the court affirmed the States Steamship Co.
finding that subsidized shippers were not to be denied the benefits
of the investment tax credit, noting that any restriction on the
credit not specifically contained in the language of the Revenue
Act of 1962 would defeat the intent of Congress. Relying on previous holdings that the tax credit provisions are to be liberally
construed," the court determined that qualified investment, for
Statutes of the United States and Their Administrationby the FederalMaritime
Board and the MaritimeAdministration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 18 FED.

B.J. 355 (1958).
28. 513 F.2d 1342 (Ct.C1. 1975).
29. Pacific Far E. Lines, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 1355 (Ct.Cl. 1975).
30. States S.S. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 832 (Ct.C1. 1970). For a discussion of the investment tax credit's relation to airline subsidies, see North Central
Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 363 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (credit may
not be used to reduce airline's subsidy); 33 J. AIR L. & ComM. 165 (1967).
31. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1962). See also H.R. REP. No.
2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1962).
32. 428 F.2d 832 (Ct.Cl. 1970).

33. 428 F.2d at 837.
34. See, e.g., Minot Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 435 F.2d 1368,
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the purposes of the credit, is the taxpayer's basis in the property.
That basis, the court explained, is the taxpayer's cost " regardless
of the source of funds used, 3 except as specifically altered by provisions of the Revenue Act.37 Since the tax treatment of reserve funds
under the closing agreements merely deferred the recognition of
income until a future period, 38 the court concluded that the agreements were merely special depreciation arrangements, similar to
other accelerated depreciation schemes. Finding the closing agreements not to be related to the purposes of the tax credit, the court
affirmed the States Steamship Co. principle that the parties to
such agreements are not to be bound to future changes in the tax
1372 (8th Cir. 1970); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. United States, 513 F.2d at 1353;
Alabama Displays, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 844, 848 (Ct.C1. 1974).
35. I.R.C. § 46(c)(1)(A) defines "qualified investment" as "the applicable
percentage of basis of each new section 38 property ....

"

""Section 38 property"

includes vessels by operation of I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(B)(iii). Under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.46-3(c)(1):
The basis of any new section 38 shall be determined in accordance with the
general rules for determining basis of property. Thus, the basis of property
would generally be its cost ...

and would include all items properly in-

cluded by the taxpayer in the depreciable basis of the property, such as
installation and freight costs.
36. The court noted that investments are often made with borrowed funds,
which are not taxed when received by the taxpayer. The court also noted that
"money received as a gift exempt from tax [I.R.C. § 1021, .

.

. interest earned

by the taxpayer on tax-exempt municipal bonds [I.R.C. § 103]," and other
similar untaxed income could, likewise, be used to make investments on which
the investment tax credit would be applicable. 544 F.2d at 485.
37. The court cited two examples of provisions making specific exclusions
from the tax credit: I.R.C. § 46(c)(4) (insurance proceeds invested in replacement
property) and I.R.C. § 362(c)(2) (property purchased with funds contributed to a
corporation by a non-stockholder). The court concluded that since some specific
exclusions were made, Congress must have intended that in all other cases "the
basis be the full amount of the moneys invested .

. . ."

Id. at 486.

38. "Since basis controls the computation of depreciation, future annual deductions for depreciation expense would thus be reduced by operation of the
agreement. New ships would earn a larger taxable income than in the absence of
the agreement, and over the life of the ships the government would recover the
taxes that had been deferred when the deposited income was earned. To illustrate, $100 of earnings deposited in the reserve funds would be untaxed when
earned. But when invested in a new ship costing $1000 the untaxed $100 would
reduce the basis for depreciation ('cost basis') of the new ship to $900. Over the
20-year life of the new ship the annual deduction for depreciation would be $45
rather than $50, the $5 difference would be taxable income, and in 20 years the
government would have recovered the deferred taxes on $100." Id. at 488 n.11
(citing brief for plaintiff) (footnotes omitted).
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laws. 9 The court also determined that it was not to be bound by a
revenue ruling excluding investments made with reserve funds
from a ship owner's basis for purposes of the investment tax
credit,4 ' particularly since the ruling did not issue until 1967, while
the credits were claimed for the years 1962-64.42 The court concluded that reserve fund capital invested in new vessels was properly to be included in taxpayer's basis in the vessels for the purposes of the investment tax credit.
The instant case is one of first impression, insofar as the court
has undertaken a determination of the tax status of contractors'
reserve funds. In concluding that the tax-deferred treatment of
reserve funds constitutes merely a special depreciation arrangement,43 however, the instant court has created an anomalous form
of depreciation deduction. Ordinarily the first depreciation deduction taken on new property, whether accelerated or straight-line,
is made at the end of the taxable year in which the property was
purchased. The depreciation scheme here established allows a deduction (in the amount of reserve funds eventually invested in the
ship) to be taken before the property is purchased. The effect is
that new vessels are depreciated in the amount of reserve funds
invested at the moment of their acquisition. The logical applica39. The IRS contended that the investment tax credit was in the contemplation of the parties insofar as the 1964 credit was concerned, since taxpayer had
entered a new closing agreement in that year. The court rejected the contention
on the ground that "the new agreement, as compared with the 1947 agreement,
contained identical terms and conditions concerning the nonrecognition of tax
deferred funds in the determination of cost basis ...... Id. at 490.

40. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142,
1147 (5th Cir. 1971).
41. Rev. Rul. 67-395, 1967-2 C.B. 11.
42. Cowan, C.J., and Skelton, J., dissented. Cowan, C.J., determined that the
closing agreements reduced taxpayer's basis for all tax purposes, rejecting the
majority's conclusion that the agreements constituted special depreciation arrangements. Referring to a subsequent Senate report (S. REP. No. 938, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 196-97 (1976)), he found that Congress had not contemplated the
instant situation when it defined basis as cost and decided that I.R.C. provisions
and Treasury Regulations relied upon by the majority were, therefore, inapplicable. He concluded that both the applicable law and the legislative history militated against taxpayer's position. 544 F.2d at 491-93 (Cowan, C.J., dissenting).
Skelton, J., found that the 1964 closing agreement bound taxpayer to the I.R.S.
position. Accepting the I.R.S. contention that use of reserve funds in calculating
investment tax credit would allow taxpayer a double deduction, he concluded
that Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(b) (2) (1964) precluded use of reserve funds in computing
the credit. Id. at 493 (Skelton, J., dissenting).
43. See note 37 supra.
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tion of this scheme would compel a judgment for the IRS in the
instant case. In order to preserve its holding, therefore, the instant
court has left this area of the tax law at least as confused as it was
prior to this decision. To determine whether reserve fund investments are to be properly included in the calculation of total investment, it is now necessary to ascertain the purpose of the taxing
statute. The court implies that if a tax provision is concerned with
the amount expended, monies spent from reserve funds may be
properly included in computations. Where provisions are concerned primarily with the taxpayer's depreciated basis, however,
investments made with reserve funds would be excluded from calculations, much as depreciation taken under more conventional
schemes would be subtracted from a taxpayer's cost in determining basis. Most of the statutes of the former description would be
economic incentives, rather than revenue-raising measures. For
most tax purposes, therefore, reserve fund investments still may
not properly be included, even though the instant court has accorded the fund agreements the status of depreciation arrangements.
Clifford D. Harmon

